


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


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Article Analyzes U.S. Military Strategy

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in Chinese No 3, 13 Jul 92 pp 48-53

[Article by Ruan Zongze (7086 1350 3419): "New Trends in the Readjustment of U.S. Military Strategy"]

[Text] The main aspects of readjusting U.S. military strategy are to: Shift defense priorities to coping with "uncertain" regional conflicts; cut down military expenditures and reduce the armed forces while raising their capabilities for rapid response and power projection; make massive reductions in the nuclear arsenal and place less reliance on it; strengthen nonproliferation mechanisms; and implement the "Plan for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes."

The readjustments now under way will sharpen the contradictions between the United States and Third World countries and further erode U.S. credibility with its allies. The readjustments in U.S. military strategy are aimed at maintaining "nuclear superiority" and serving President Bush's goal for a "new world order."

Since the first half of 1989, the United States has considered readjusting its military strategy. The drastic changes in Eastern Europe, the Gulf war, and particularly the disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in tremendous changes in the secure environment the United States had been in since World War II. In view of the new world situation, the U.S. Government has successively taken some major measures to readjust its military strategy; however, such readjustments will involve a long-term, complicated process, while the United States continues to readjust its military strategy. Despite this, we still can see some major trends in the readjustment of U.S. military strategy.

I.

The main aspects of readjustment in U.S. military strategy:

1. U.S. defense priorities are shifting from coping with a large-scale, all-out armed offensive to coping with "uncertain" regional conflicts. One of the results of World War II was that the Soviet Union emerged as a strong adversary to the United States and contended with it. The United States immediately adopted a "containment" strategy, with a view to stopping the expansion of Soviet power and giving tit for tat. Thus, a confrontation between two military blocs—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, led by the United States, and the Warsaw Pact, headed by the Soviet Union—occurred in Europe. In the several decades of cold war since then, the priority in U.S. military strategy had been to prevent the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact bloc from launching a large-scale armed offensive against the West; however, radical changes have taken place in the world since 1989. The Warsaw Pact was disbanded, the Soviet Union has disintegrated, and the traditional Soviet threat no longer exists; however, the breakout of the Gulf war made the United States realize that the challenges of regional powers to the United States have become increasingly salient. In such circumstances, the United States must ensure that its global strategic interests are not threatened by regional powers. Such changes have caused major shifts in the objectives of U.S. military strategy. In an important speech at the

U.S. A-Si-Peng Society [as published] on 2 August 1990, President Bush clearly announced that the priority of the U.S. defense plan has shifted from coping with the global Soviet threat to coping with major regional conflicts. U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney further expounded on President Bush's concept. He said: The cold-war danger of large-scale invasions into the West by the Warsaw Pact no longer exists. The post-cold war challenges mainly come from major regional threats, as displayed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Such regional threats could suddenly happen without advance warning. The dangers of regional crises have increased because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (Footnote one—see U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's 1 March 1991 defense report) This shows that a turning point has occurred in U.S. military guiding principles.

2. The United States plans to cut military spending, reduce their armed forces, and enhance the military's rapid response and mobilization capability. The Bush administration has decided to cut \$50 billion in military spending and reduce the armed forces by 25 percent in the next five years—that is, reducing the total forces from 2.1 million to 1.6 million. Following the reduction, the size of the armed forces will be the smallest since 1950. The following specific cut has been planned: for armed forces, from 18 to 12 active duty divisions and from 10 to eight reserve duty divisions; for the number of naval vessels, from the current 545 to 451, of which the number of aircraft carriers will be reduced from 14 to 12; for tactical fighter wings, from 24 to 15 active duty wings and from 12 to 11 reserve duty wings; and for the number of strategic bombers, from 260 to 181. Meanwhile, the United States plans to reorganize the military's structure by separately abolishing, merging, and reorganizing 10 major commands directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff into eight major commands. This is to enhance the forces' flexibility and quick-response capability. Of these commands, the "crash force command" was re-established following the U.S. experience in the Gulf War. The plan aims to raise the ratio of the U.S. rapid response forces to the entire forces from 20 percent to 40 percent.

In addition, the United States has drawn up plans for overseas troop withdrawals. It has decided to cut by half its 300,000 troops currently stationed in Europe by 1995. The U.S. Defense Department has also drawn up plans to slash its troops stationed in the Asia-Pacific region over three stages in the next 10 years (1990-2000). For the first stage, it plans to withdraw 15,200 of the 135,000 U.S. forces from the Asia-Pacific by the end of 1992. Of these total, 7,000, 5,000-6,000, and 2,000 will be withdrawn from South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, respectively. Future cuts in U.S. troops stationed in the region will depend on circumstances. (Footnote two—United Press International, Washington, English, 19 April 1990) In short, the "partial readjustment in defenses will be aimed at active duty forces and be on a smaller scale," but will be "more globally geared." (Footnote three—American Press Munich, 3 February 1990, speech delivered by U.S. National Security Adviser Scowcroft at the annual meeting of monthly magazine NATIONAL DEFENSE KNOWLEDGE in Munich) In other words, the United States will ensure that after the readjustment, its

troops will be able to "fight two large-scale regional wars" in the Gulf region and in the Korean Peninsula. (Footnote four—THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 February 1992).

3. The United States plans to substantially slash its nuclear weapons and to reduce its dependence on them. The United States and the Soviet Union signed a START Treaty on 31 July 1991, marking another major breakthrough in the area of nuclear disarmament, following their signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987. The treaty requires the two countries to cut their nuclear weapons by 30 percent. Over the next seven years, the treaty specifies, each side will reduce the number of strategic vehicles to fewer than 1,600, and it will maintain the level of strategic nuclear warheads below 6,000. In light of the drastic changes in the Soviet Union's domestic situation following the "19 August" incident, President Bush made new proposals in September 1991 and again in January 1992, calling for more substantial cuts in nuclear weapons, as he took the initiative in diminishing the danger of nuclear weapons falling into "the hands of irresponsible individuals" in the course of the Soviet Union's disintegration. His proposals were aimed at seeking a maximum reduction in the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenals and at maintaining the U.S. nuclear lead amid the difficulties confronting the Soviet Union and the CIS. Acting on President Bush's directive, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney announced an end to the "state of readiness" for 40 U.S. strategic bombers.

In reality, the United States showed new nuclear strategic concepts as early as July 1990, when NATO held a summit meeting in London. The meeting decided to make nuclear arms the weapons of "last resort" and introduced major changes to NATO's "quick-response" strategy. In October 1991, a NATO foreign ministerial meeting announced plans to slash European-based, short-range nuclear weapons by 80 percent in an effort to further defuse nuclear confrontation in Europe.

4. The United States plans to reinforce the mechanism of nonproliferation, including that for preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the nuclear, biological, and chemical fields. It also plans to tighten control over delivery vehicles for these weapons. In the Persian Gulf war, Iraq used "Scud" missiles and threatened to resort to chemical weapons. The Soviet Union's disintegration heightened the U.S. sense of urgency about the need to prevent nuclear proliferation. At a meeting of the UN General Assembly's First Committee in October of 1991, Ronald Lehman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, explicitly noted that changes in the situation had shifted the focus of arms control to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.

Statements by many U.S. politicians indicate that the United States has elevated the issue of "preventing nuclear proliferation" to strategic heights, considering it an important component for establishing a "New World Order." To this end, the U.S. Administration announced in March 1991 three specific measures, adopting a licensing system on exporting technology and equipment that can be used for both military and civilian purposes; stepping up control over

exporting sensitive chemicals that can be used for manufacturing chemical weapons; and imposing penalties on enterprises that illegally help other countries develop weapons and missiles. According to reports, in view of the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. Congress has appropriated \$400 million from the defense budget and dispatched senior nuclear technology experts to the CIS to help destroy the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. Moreover, the United States and Russia have also decided, after consultations, to set up a Western-sponsored "international information exchange center" to find employment for nuclear scientists of the former Soviet Union, in a bid to prevent nuclear proliferation caused by displacement of these nuclear elitists.

Sharing a common need on the issue of preventing nuclear proliferation, the United States and Western countries are stepping up efforts to implement policies for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. They all emphasize the necessity to bring into full play the mechanisms of the "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty" and the "Missile Technology Regime," as well as the important role of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency in preventing proliferation of and exercising supervision over nuclear weaponry. It has also been reported that Western countries are studying a plan to expand and transform the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, which was originally directed against the socialist countries, into a new system for controlling the exportation and transfer of high technology to developing countries.

5. The United States plans to revise its "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI] and implement a new "Global Protection Against Limited Strikes" [GPALS] plan. This idea was first proposed by President Bush in his "State of the Union Address" at the beginning of 1991. He said: The SDI focus should be shifted to providing protective means against limited missile strikes regardless of where they come from. The idea was materialized by the U.S. Department of Defense under the codename of GPALS. The plan consisted of two main components: A land-based defense system composed of 100 missile interceptors and a space defense system composed of 1,000 "Brilliant Pebbles." The United States plans to begin deployment of this new antimissile limited defense system in North Dakota in the mid-1990's.

The GPALS plan, which is in accord with the realities of the diminishing Soviet military threat and tight budget of the United States, will rely mainly on existing technology while avoiding certain technological problems. According to estimates, the new limited defense system will require only \$46 billion (based on the value of the U.S. dollar in 1991) and 14 years of time to complete the deployment. (Footnote five—THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10 February 1992) This is a much smaller budget than the original \$100 billion for the SDI. Moreover, the GPALS plan is technologically feasible. In fact, some of the technology has already been used in the first "space war," during the Gulf war. U.S. military reconnaissance satellites over the Gulf were able to detect the launching of Iraqi "Scud" missiles and thus helped "Patriot" missiles on the ground intercept "Scud" missiles and destroy their ground launchers (Footnote six—THE

WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10 February 1992). According to reports, the United States has already obtained the technological proof for the "Brilliant Pebbles" after more than 400 tests. (Footnote seven—THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, 15 July 1990) The readjustment of the U.S. SDI (mainly to deal with large-scale Soviet missile strikes) indicates that the United States has already expanded the scope of its nuclear defense to Third World countries. This is an important step taken by the United States based on real deterrents toward establishing a nuclear strategy with both offensive and defensive systems.

II.

Military strategy is, in fact, a comprehensive reflection of realities in internal, economic, and military affairs as well as the technology of a given historical period. The main factors that have prompted the United States to readjust its military strategy include the following:

1. The "Soviet threat" no longer exists. Through a duel of comprehensive national strength with the United States for a half a century, the Soviet Union disintegrated and collapsed by itself without even fighting a war. Although Russia has inherited control over the former Soviet Union's mammoth troops and nuclear arsenal, the Russian leaders, proceeding from the current needs, have implemented a pro-Western foreign policy, going all out for unilateral disarmament, recalling the alert status of Russian nuclear weapons, and announcing removal of U.S. cities from the targets of the intercontinental ballistic missiles controlled by the Russians. These changes have invalidated the U.S. nuclear strategy of "mutual assurance of destruction." As far as the former Soviet Union's troops are concerned, following the "19 August" incident, 80 percent of the senior generals were removed through large-scale reshuffling. Moreover, other CIS member states have demanded that troops of the former Soviet Union within their territories be put under their jurisdiction. As a result, the troops are in a divided "state of comprehensive shrinking."

Meanwhile, with Russia tied up in its internal affairs and urgently needing massive economic aid from Western countries, it has no time or the resources to revitalize its armaments. In the near future, Russia will not constitute a threat to the security of the United States and other Western nations. Furthermore, in a speech to the United Nations on 31 January, Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed to the United States the joint establishment of a "global missile defense system." U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney called this proposal a "major breakthrough." (Footnote eight—THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 10 February 1992) U.S. public opinion generally agrees that the proposal has given the United States a "historic opportunity" to incorporate Russia and other CIS member-states into the Western security system.

2. "Instability" and "uncertainty" of regional conflicts are the "real threat" to the U.S. strategic interests. With the collapse of the bipolar structure, the global powers have lost balance. Long-hidden contradictions and political, economic, ethnic, and territorial disputes between some countries and regions

have escalated and become increasingly apparent, developing into new "hot spots" characterized primarily by "uncertainty." The Gulf crisis is a case in point. Washington believes that "the real threat facing us consists of unknown and unpredictable factors. This threat means instability and the lack of preparedness to deal with a crisis or war, which nobody can predict and estimate." (Footnote nine—XINHUA English dispatch from Washington 29 January on the 1992 U.S. "National Military Strategy" signed by Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell) Therefore, the Pentagon has proposed a "plan" for U.S. countermeasures to deal with seven regional conflicts which may involve the United States. It is understood that to help compile the 1994-99 U.S. defense budget, U.S. military sectors conceived the sites and circumstances of seven hypothetical conflicts, as well as U.S. strategies and combat responses to deal with these potential threats. The seven "hypothetical" conflicts are: an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; a North Korean attack on South Korea; the simultaneous occurrence of the above two; a Russian attack on Lithuania with the support of Byelorussia; a coup d'etat in the Philippines; a crisis in Panama; and the reemergence of a new hegemonic superpower. (Footnote 10—THE NEW YORK TIMES, 17 February 1992) In this way, we can see that the United States attaches extraordinary importance to regional conflicts.

3. The issue of nuclear proliferation has become complicated. It is generally believed that the transformation of the Soviet nuclear power into four nuclear states is in itself a matter of nuclear proliferation. What worries people even more is that these four newly separated nuclear states are facing serious economic difficulties, ethnic unrest, territorial disputes, and other contradictions that cannot be resolved in a short period of time. Once such contradictions are aggravated, the outflow and loss of control over the former Soviet Union's gigantic nuclear arsenal, nuclear technology, and nuclear elitists can happen anytime. According to Mikhaylov, a former Soviet military planning strategist, more than 100,000 people were involved in the development of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union; among them, 10,000-15,000 people had access to real secret information and 2,000-3,000 were in control of top secret information. (Footnote 11—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 13 January 1992) In a sense, control over the proliferation of nuclear technology and expertise is much more difficult than that of nuclear weapons. It is also worthy to note that although Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan have in principle agreed to become "nuclear-free countries," they are wary that once they lose their nuclear technology they may be ordered around by Russia.

In addition, based on various considerations for interests, a number of Third World countries have vied with each other in developing nuclear energy. According to a Pentagon estimate, by the end of this century, 15-20 countries will have the capability to launch guided missiles, and a half of these nations will possess nuclear arms. With rapid progress in science and technology and increasing international exchanges, it is almost impossible to completely stop these

developing countries from developing nuclear weapons. As a result, nuclear proliferation has become a protracted and complicated issue.

4. The United States faces increasingly great pressure from economic recession and social problems. In recent years, the U.S. economy has been characterized by low savings, high consumption, low accumulations, high deficits, and deficit spending. Deficits and debts have been significantly handicapping U.S. economic growth. Although certain signs of recovery appeared after the crash in July 1990, the upturns were feeble, and the economy receded again in the fourth quarter of 1991. That created an interesting phenomenon of "double-valley recession." Although the recession was not as serious as the one in the early 1980's, the long duration has created the most serious crisis of confidence in the United States in 30 years. The deterioration of the economic state has also exacerbated social problems in the United States. The media has been criticizing the U.S. Government for its ineffective education policy and medical insurance policy.

Although the United States has "won" the cold war, it paid a dear price. During the cold war, and especially during the Reagan administration, the United States' colossal military expenditures weakened the competitive capability of the U.S. economy and created enormous deficits and an unfavorable trade balance, turning this biggest creditor nation into the biggest debtor nation with net foreign debts reaching \$760 billion in 1990. Confronted with such serious economic and social problems, the Bush administration has acted inappropriately and failed to achieve anything, evoking criticism from many Democratic congressmen and the media. The mentality of "neoisolationism," under the resounding slogan of "America First," is now spreading rapidly in the country, and many American people are quite receptive to the idea. Adherents to this idea maintain that the biggest "enemy" which threatens the United States most is "in America," not outside of it. The Congress and the media have strongly demanded cutting the military budget and sharing the "dividends of peace." Under such powerful pressure, the Bush administration's policy cannot help but appear "domestically oriented."

III.

It is true that, under the new situation, the United States has to readjust its military strategy. But the questions as to what extent its armament will be cut, what programs will be cut, and at what speed these things will occur will be determined by many factors, including the following:

1. The destiny of nearly 30,000 nuclear warheads owned by the former Soviet Union is still not fully certain. Although Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan agreed at the Alma-Ata conference of the CIS heads of state in late December 1991 that the CIS would exercise "centralized supervision over nuclear weapons," they are still in disagreement as to how the accord should be executed. One example can be seen in the Ukraine, which declared last March that it would stop executing the plan of relocating its tactical nuclear weapons out of the Ukraine (but it resumed carrying out the plan shortly afterward). Byelarus indicated that it has to shelve the relocation project for the time being because relocation

calls for reconstructing launch silos at enormous costs, and the project can hardly be accomplished within a short time. Moreover, the state of strategic nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, known as the "Lion in Central Asia," remains uncertain. Furthermore, since the U.S.-Soviet "Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons" signed in late July last year involves Russia and three other republics of the former Soviet Union, the treaty has to be ratified by Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan. Thus, before the issue of nuclear weapons being scattered around in various CIS states has been resolved, the United States can hardly sleep in peace.

2. Russia remains a big country spanning Europe and Asia and controls an awesome military apparatus. As the saying goes, "A starved camel is still larger than a horse." Likewise, the United States still has to watch closely Russia's course of development. From a long-range viewpoint, it is still possible for Russia to be "resurrected." Conceptualizing U.S. measures to deal with seven types of conflicts which might appear during the 1990's, one possibility the U.S. Defense Department considers is that "a certain state or certain alliance of states" would rise, and it would "uphold a hostile security strategy, and it has the military capability to threaten U.S. interests through global military competition," and thus "a recurring critical global threat" would appear. THE NEW YORK TIMES straightforwardly stated that this is a "euphemism" for describing Russia's resurrection to become a military power. (Footnote 12—Ibid, footnote 10.) Besides, the continuous unrest in Eastern Europe, the instability within the CIS, the growing trend of seeking "independence" but not a "commonwealth" among the members, and the continual appearance and growing intensification of new "hot spots" and so forth are factors which the United States must consider while readjusting its military strategy.

3. The escalation in the arming of regional powers compels the United States to uphold its military thinking of "forward deployment." As a result of the disintegration of the Yalta structure, the world situation has become one of "global relaxation and regional tension." Arms races have even appeared in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. Before the Gulf crisis came to a close, a new round of the arms race had already started in the Middle East. Despite the United Nations' efforts to curb the arms race in the Gulf region after the war ended there, the success it has achieved is insignificant. The arming of nations in the Asia-Pacific region also has escalated. Japan's military development is particularly eye-catching. Japan's defense budget exceeded 4 trillion yen [Y] for the first time in 1990—a figure 6.1 percent higher than the year before. Japan's defense budget for the 1991-1995 period will reach Y22.76 trillion (about \$172 billion), increasing by an average of 3 percent annually. The military expenditures of some other Asia-Pacific countries also have been increasing in one way or another. The total military expenditures of the Asia-Pacific region has now reached \$250 billion, accounting for 22 percent of all military expenditures worldwide, and this share is still growing. This being the case, the U.S. Government has clearly indicated that U.S. interests in Europe, the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf require the United

States to continue to maintain its "forward deployment" so that it can respond quickly and effectively to regional crises that jeopardize U.S. interests.

4. The impact caused by cutting the military budget and reducing arms purchases is twofold. Although it can produce a "peace dividend" from a long-term point of view, it will hit the U.S. defense industry, increase unemployment, and even obstruct normal economic operations in the near future. The U.S. military-industrial complex has become an important segment of the national economy. According to statistics, the U.S. military industry accounts for as much as 20 percent of the country's entire industrial production. Currently, about one-third of the enterprises in the United States are related to arms production in one way or another. If the military industry shrinks, it will create cyclical fluctuations in the economy. While the number of workers employed by U.S. defense industries accounts for one-fifth of the workers employed by all U.S. manufacturing industries, the number of engineers and scientists working in defense-related fields accounts for 40 percent. According to estimates made by Sam Nunn, chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 million jobs related to the U.S. military will be lost by the year 1996. (Footnote 13—NEW YORK TIMES, 14 February 1992) Furthermore, various political factions in the United States have different views and disagreements regarding the extent and areas in which armament cuts are to be made, and these factions may not be able to settle their differences in the near future.

IV.

How should we approach the readjustment of U.S. military strategy? I think we can observe the issue from the following four perspectives.

First of all, the contradictions between the United States and Third World countries will sharpen. The readjustment of the U.S. military strategy shows that, after the disappearance of an East-West confrontation, the United States thinks that the situation will from now on be in its favor, and therefore it has become even more flagrant when interfering in Third World countries' internal affairs under the banners of "human rights" and "democracy," doing so with the backing of its strength. Following the readjustment of its military strategy, the United States will exert pressure on Third World countries on nuclear weapons and on the transfer of nuclear technology, and this certainly will cause resentment among the vast number of Third World people. One newspaper has already warned the United States about this trend, emphasizing that "ever since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States has invariably tried to give prominence to 'Southern threat.' This is a dangerous act." (Footnote 14—France's LIBERATION, 13 April 1992) Another report says the United States is devising a plan to aim its strategic missiles at Third World targets. (Footnote 15—Britain's SUNDAY TIMES, 19 February 1992)

Second, the distrust between the United States and its allies will continue to deepen. While readjusting its military strategy, the United States does not hesitate to consider Europe and Japan as its "potential adversaries" in the future, and it also thinks that "Germany, Japan, and other rich

countries" might be interested in "nuclear temptations." In turn, the United States will make every effort to maintain its status as the "only superpower," and it will absolutely not allow this status be challenged. Although this secret document of the Defense Department was "leaked" with the Bush administration declining to comment, observers have noted that a majority of people in the U.S. Government share this view. According to one report, German Chancellor Kohl was "infuriated" by this claim and flatly rejected it. (Footnote 16—U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 4 May 1992) This shows that U.S. and its allies are actually in disagreement with each other, although they seem to be in harmony. It is likely that they will become even more wary with one another.

Third, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy is designed to ensure U.S. "nuclear supremacy." On one hand, the United States is maintaining its relations with its allies and using the United Nations to energetically pursue the so-called "proliferation-prevention diplomacy" for fear that nuclear weapons, nuclear experts, and nuclear technology from the former Soviet Union might flow into developing countries and lead to nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, the United States is buying sophisticated technology from the former Soviet Union at low prices and hiring the latter's nuclear scientists. The Bush administration recently agreed to buy from Russia a "Topaz" space nuclear reactor and plutonium-238 fuel for \$14 million. The deal also includes two "Hall-type" boosters. The U.S. Department of Energy is buying a giant magnet from Russia for \$200 million, to be used in its \$8.25 billion Superconducting Super Collider. In addition, U.S. companies and the U.S. Government are buying the former Soviet Union's high technologies and hiring the latter's advanced technical personnel. (Footnote 17—U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 4 May 1992) The U.S. SDI organization has formulated a plan to obtain some specific technologies and key scientists and engineers from the former Soviet Union's anti-ICBM program. The plan calls for obtaining technologies developed by the former Soviet Union in more than 50 fields, particularly those in six fields in which the former Soviet Union had an edge over the United States. (Footnote 18—AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 10 February 1992) The U.S. move could achieve three purposes: preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear experts, and nuclear technology into developing countries; saving several billion dollars in research expenses; and enhancing U.S. nuclear strength. This shows that the United States is trying to maintain its nuclear supremacy through the "nuclear nonproliferation" policy.

Fourth, U.S. military strategic readjustment is designed to establish a "new world order" under U.S. leadership. Since the end of the cold war, the world situation has undergone fundamental changes. The political system has changed in East Europe, the Soviet Union has disintegrated, and the United States has become the "only" superpower. The United States believes now is a good time for Western social systems and values to prevail in the world. Therefore, it has proposed the concept of establishing a "new world order" under U.S. leadership. The U.S. global strategic objective has changed from one of contending for hegemony with the Soviet Union to one of coping with any potential challenge

and threat to the U.S. status as the only superpower. U.S. military strategy is an important component of its overall global strategy. The readjustment of its military strategy is consistent with changes in its global strategy, because both the military strategy and the global strategy serve the purpose of establishing a "new world order."

'New Issues' in Nuclear Disarmament, Strategies
OW0408061692 Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU
in Chinese No. 3, 13 Jul 92 p 42-47

[Article by Li Weiguo (2621 5898 0948): "New Issues in the Readjustment of Nuclear Strategies and Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] The environment for nuclear strategies has undergone enormous changes in the wake of the complete breakup of the bipolar world. These changes have found expression in these aspects: U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation has, by and large, come to an end; the process of nuclear disarmament is picking up speed; nuclear weapons programs are slowing down; and nuclear proliferation has intensified. All nuclear countries have intensified the readjustment of their nuclear strategies, based on their views about the state of their security and international status. Certain noteworthy issues have appeared in the sphere of nuclear disarmament—issues such as unilateral nuclear disarmament, multilateral nuclear relations, and the prohibition of nuclear tests. The prevention of nuclear proliferation remains the most urgent task to be dealt with today.

1. Changes in the Environment for Nuclear Strategies After the Cold War

Generally speaking, changes in the environment for nuclear strategies can primarily be observed in the conclusion of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation; and while the process of nuclear disarmament has accelerated and nuclear weapons programs are slowing down, the world faces the danger of exacerbating nuclear proliferation.

(1) **The end of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation.** Ever since the start of U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation in the 1950's, the two countries always maintained a high profile of using nuclear weapons as deterrence. With the signing of the "Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces" in the late 1980's and the "Treaty on Reducing Strategic Weapons" on 31 July last year, the level of the two countries' nuclear confrontation subsided. After the "19 August" incident, dramatic changes occurred in the Soviet Union, and the country was no longer a military adversary of the West. As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union late last year, the world's bipolar pattern also completely disintegrated. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin responded positively to the unilateral disarmament proposals which President Bush set forth on 27 September last year and on 28 January this year. The United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) also reduced the level of their alertness. On 22 February, Yeltsin declared that the Commonwealth of Independent States' nuclear weapons targeted at the West would be on "zero alert." The United States also changed its strategic priorities to dealing with contingencies in major areas. On 1 February, the American and Russian Presidents declared that U.S.-Russian relations

would be characterized by "friendship and partnership" in their Camp David statement. This shows that the bipolar nuclear confrontation no longer exists. Nevertheless, the West is still on guard against the former states of the Soviet Union, especially Russia; and this is why the United States, Britain, and France have yet to pledge publicly to change the nuclear objectives meant for the former Soviet Union.

(2) **The process of nuclear disarmament has accelerated.** Following the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and its disintegration, the process of nuclear disarmament has accelerated. On 23 May, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan signed a protocol to reaffirm the validity of the treaty on reducing nuclear weapons signed by the Presidents of the United States and the former Soviet Union in Moscow last year. The protocol did not revise any provisions in the treaty which provides that, within seven years after the treaty has become effective, all signatories shall reduce their strategic nuclear weapons by one-third. President Bush declared on 27 September last year, that the United States would take the initiative to reduce its short-range and strategic nuclear weapons, and he also urged the Soviet Union to take corresponding steps. The U.S. initiative received a positive response from all parts of the world. Britain announced that it would support the U.S. initiative by reducing its short-range and strategic nuclear weapons. France announced that it would cut its planned output of the short-range nuclear missile, the Hades, from 120 to 30, and that these missiles would be kept in storage and not deployed as planned. The Soviet Union announced that it would take seven "corresponding steps" to reciprocate the U.S. initiative. Not only did it totally accept the U.S. initiative, but it also put forward a plan for reducing more nuclear weapons than the U.S. would reduce. Under such circumstances, NATO defense ministers decided on 17 October to cut 80 percent of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. President Bush, in his State of the Union address on 28 January this year, again set forth a new unilateral nuclear disarmament plan to make another substantial cut in the United States' strategic nuclear weapons. This new plan involved land- and sea-based and plane-carried strategic nuclear weapons. The next day, Russian President Yeltsin responded positively to Bush's unilateral nuclear disarmament plan, and announced that Russia would substantially reduce its strategic nuclear weapons. Then, the two countries promptly consulted with one another on this issue and planned to sign a new accord when Yeltsin visited the United States this summer.

Regionally speaking, nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are to be cut most substantially since most of the U.S. and Soviet (Russian) short-range and tactical nuclear weapons are there. This reflects the enormous changes that have taken place in the state of European security in recent years. Regarding the types of nuclear weapons subject to reduction, they cover almost all types of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, including submarine-launched missiles and other types that the United States was unwilling to cut. This has laid a very good foundation for the United States and Russia to further cut their nuclear weapons.

(3) **Nuclear weapons programs have slowed down.** Nuclear countries such as the United States and Russia have not

abandoned their nuclear weapons modernization programs; however, compared with the past, the quantities have been reduced, the size of the programs has been reduced, and the speed has slowed down. As early as 1990, the United States had already scrapped the plan to modernize its short-range and tactical nuclear weapons. It declared last year that it would halt the development of the mobile MX intercontinental ballistic missiles and the Midgetman, a small ICBM. This year, the United States has again reduced the purchase of B-2 strategic bombers from 75 to 20, and it will halt production of some advanced nuclear weapons. In his 1993 defense budget, President Bush calls for suspending the production of B-2 strategic bombers, Seawolf nuclear submarines, and nuclear warheads. According to U.S. media, the United States will freeze the production of nearly all newly designed weapons. The United States has also revised and reduced the size of its Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. On the part of the Soviet Union, it declared last year that it would stop the development of small mobile ICBM's and would not increase the number of, or improve, its mobile, rail-based ICBM's. Furthermore, the Russian parliament, in a retrenchment budget approved in late January 1992, reduced this year's budget for purchasing weapons to less than one-seventh of that of 1991. This has compelled Russia to postpone or even halt its programs of improving and developing certain nuclear weapons. When Yeltsin visited France in early February 1992, France also had slowed some of its nuclear development plans.

The deceleration of nuclear weapons modernization programs and the acceleration of nuclear disarmament influence and enhance one another. On the one hand, the acceleration of nuclear disarmament has directly decelerated the process of nuclear weapons modernization programs; on the other hand, the deceleration or the scrapping of certain nuclear development plans has created a counteraction that can expedite the process of nuclear disarmament. In this sense, shrinking the modernization plans for nuclear weapons or imposing a moratorium on these plans or scrapping some parts of these plans are important aspects of nuclear disarmament.

(4) Nuclear proliferation intensifies. Nuclear proliferation is now an issue that has caught worldwide attention. The fact that an increasing number of countries want to own nuclear weapons shows the demand of nuclear proliferation. With the bipolar pattern disintegrated, the world has become increasingly multipolarized, and the previous regional conflicts triggered by U.S.-Soviet rivalry have been settled or nearly settled. This, however, has created a new vacuum of strength. This situation and the rise of nationalism, religious forces, and regional powers have created certain factors that lead to instability, and some countries' sense of insecurity has heightened. In their search for national security, many countries may opt for nuclear weapons as their means of deterrence, because weak countries can use a small quantity of nuclear weapons to deter military interference from much more powerful countries. Besides, the technology needed for the development of nuclear weapons is much lower and much cheaper than what is needed for the development of certain advanced conventional weapons systems, and the networks that have to be established to track down targets

are also much more simple. Therefore, as far as these countries are concerned, ownership of nuclear weapons may be very appealing. For regional powers, the ownership of nuclear weapons can also elevate their status in their own regions. According to an estimate made by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney, by the end of this century, 15-20 countries in unstable regions might have nuclear capabilities, and some of them will possess nuclear weapons.

As for the supply of nuclear weapons, the international community has pinpointed the main source of nuclear proliferation to the former Soviet Union. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has transformed one nuclear power into four nuclear countries. In the West, it is even believed that this transformation is in itself a matter of nuclear proliferation. Previously, there were only five permanent members of the Security Council, each of whom acknowledged the possession of nuclear weapons. Now there are eight countries that have made that acknowledgment—in the order of the amount of nuclear weapons they possess: the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Britain, France, Byelarus, and China. Second, there have been indications of control being lost over the former Soviet Union's nuclear weaponry systems; facilities, technology, and materials for making nuclear weapons; and nuclear scientists. Therefore, the prevention of nuclear proliferation is a pressing and serious issue.

2. Readjustment of the Nuclear Strategies of Big Countries

The great change in the international security environment has prompted all nuclear countries to step up efforts to readjust their national security strategies in light of their own security environment and international status as they perceive them. Nuclear strategy, as an important component of security strategy, is bound to be readjusted accordingly, except that the objective, content, scope, and speed of the readjustment are different in each country.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, one nuclear superpower has turned into four nuclear countries, which rank second, third, fourth, and seventh in the world in terms of the amount of nuclear weapons they possess. The question of who should inherit and control the nuclear legacy left over from the former Soviet Union or the crucial issue of who could press the nuclear button has drawn worldwide attention. Through consultations, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan have agreed to turn the nuclear button over to Russian President Yeltsin on condition that he consult with the other three presidents when using the button.

Soon afterwards, the CIS, headed by Russia, accelerated the pace of readjusting its nuclear strategy. Judging from the current situation, the readjustment has been carried out in the following aspects: First, it has abandoned the two targets of waging a nuclear war and aiming its nuclear weapons against the United States and its Western allies. Second, it has set up two goals: the so-called "four in one" and the effect of minimum nuclear deterrent. The former refers to the goal of turning Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan into nuclear-free countries while allowing Russia to keep nuclear weapons; the latter refers to the proportionate and gradual reduction of nuclear weapons to the minimum amount for

effecting deterrence, or to 2,000-2,500 nuclear warheads. Third, It has adopted the specific measures of lowering nuclear war preparedness to zero alert, drastically reducing nuclear weapons, curbing nuclear tests (for one year), partially halting the deployment of nuclear weapons, halting or reducing the production of certain nuclear weapons and materials, and partly halting the plan for developing nuclear weapons. If the CIS can realize its readjusted nuclear strategy, we will see a nuclear force with the following manifestations: 1) Ground nuclear weapons will exist only in Russia; 2) Nuclear targets will no longer be aimed at the Western countries; 3) The amount of nuclear weapons will be drastically reduced; 4) The nuclear force will be restricted to defensive purpose. This will completely change the former Soviet Union's nuclear strategy and exert a significant influence on the world.

However, the CIS's effort to readjust the nuclear strategy has been hampered by certain circles from within. 1) Disputes and differences of opinion between Ukraine and Russia may deflate the goal of "four in one"; 2) Instability within the CIS has brought about a number of destabilizing factors in readjusting the nuclear strategy; 3) The issue of nuclear proliferation remains rather serious as seen from recent reports on smuggling and losing of control over nuclear weapons. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether readjustment of the nuclear strategy can proceed smoothly.

The U.S. readjustment of nuclear strategy is of a progressive nature. Its past nuclear strategy was directed against the Soviet Union. Now that the cold war has ended and the Soviet Union has disintegrated, the United States has thus changed its views on the Soviet threat—turning from a major actual threat into a latent one. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States not only has stopped treating it as an antagonist but has set up new "partnership" relations with Russia. No country in the world currently can pose a significant and actual threat to U.S. interests, but the United States believes that some uncertain latent threats still exist. 1) The United States is worried about contingencies in important areas of the Third World countries, particularly the intermingling of Islamic fundamentalism with nuclear proliferation. 2) The United States actually still regards Russia as a latent enemy state because of the internal instability within the CIS and especially because the centralization of political power may recur in Russia. Among the seven future hypothetical conflicts set by the United States recently, two of them are from Russia and others are from the Persian Gulf, the Korean peninsula, the Philippines, and Panama. 3) To maintain its position as the sole superpower in the world, the United States even sees its own Western allies as "latent antagonists." For this reason, the United States Department of Defense has called for guarding against Germany and Japan, who may become "global competitors" contending with the United States.

The United States views on threats directly affect the readjustment of its national security and military strategies. Regarding readjustment of nuclear strategy, the United States has readjusted its selection of nuclear targets, state of alert, procedure of operations, and types and amounts of

nuclear weapons without discarding its global nuclear deterrence and its structure of strategic forces—the "three in one" of Army, Navy, and Air Force. 1) The United States has given up the nuclear strategy and policy of waging a large-scale nuclear war against the Soviet Union and of a world war and has shifted part of its nuclear targets to turbulent areas in countries of the Third World, countries with few nuclear weapons, and countries on the nuclear threshold. It is thus clear that the pluralization of nuclear targets has become a new aspect of U.S. nuclear strategy. 2) In view of the changed security environment, the United States believes that it is necessary to accelerate the pace of nuclear disarmament. To this end, Bush has twice put forward proposals of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament involves types and amounts of nuclear weapons. In this aspect, the United States stresses the flexibility and survivability of nuclear power and the preservation of its global deterrent force. 3) To maintain its "world leadership," the United States has attempted to gain nuclear superiority. If we say that last year's U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty shows the balance of nuclear power sliding to the United States, then it is right to say that the United States is actually seeking nuclear superiority after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Provided the CIS approves the bilateral nonreciprocal reduction of nuclear weapons, the United States will be assured of its nuclear superiority. In terms of the U.S.-proposed amount of nuclear weapons to be preserved, the number is more than that of the Russian-proposed 2,000-2,500 warheads and those of Great Britain, France, and China combined. This is because that the future nuclear power of the countries on the nuclear threshold is considered. In terms of the types of nuclear weapons to be reduced, the United States has asked Russia to destroy the nucleus of its strategic nuclear power—the state-of-the-art land-based multiple warhead missiles—whereas the United States preserves a substantial amount of submarine-launched multiple warhead missiles. 4) The United States has set the work of ensuring nuclear stability and preventing nuclear proliferation as the focal point of its nuclear strategy. 5) The United States has readjusted the scale of its strategic defense program and set up a global defensive and limited attack system aiming at a limited missile attack from Third World countries and unauthorized and accidental launchings of missiles by nuclear countries. In addition, the United States has lowered its level of caution against nuclear weapons and has made some significant readjustments to matters concerning giving up or scaling down nuclear weapon research projects.

NATO is also reworking its nuclear strategy. The quick-response aspect of its original "three-in-one" military strategy is centered on making nuclear weapons the indispensable components of a strategic deterrent and on using them to deter so-called Soviet invasions (NATO's "three-in-one" military strategy is composed of nuclear, quick-response, and forward deployment components. These components are considered an organic whole, and none of them is dispensable). This is to say that the strategy does not exclude the possibility of nuclear first strikes against Soviet offensives. In July 1990, NATO revised its policy on using nuclear weapons by making them the weapons of last resort

against invaders. The move greatly altered the quick-response strategy. Meanwhile, NATO's strategy has actually further diminished the role of nuclear weapons, despite pronouncements on maintaining the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Tactical nuclear weapons have actually lost their military value in the current European security environment. NATO's nuclear arsenals have shrunk drastically following the elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range, short-range, and tactical nuclear weapons. Last October, NATO announced its plan to slash 80 percent of its tactical nuclear arsenals. The proportion of nuclear forces in NATO's military strength has decreased. The nuclear umbrella that the United States uses in protecting its nonnuclear allies through NATO has further diminished in the changed international security environment.

The new situation has also compelled Britain and France to reshape their nuclear strategies. 1) The two countries have slowed their nuclear weapons modernization programs despite their assertions of independent nuclear capabilities and their refusal to join the multilateral nuclear disarmament process and to relinquish minimum nuclear deterrent capabilities. 2) They are searching for ways to increase nuclear cooperation and have advanced plans for having their nuclear submarines perform joint precautionary security duties. 3) The British and French nuclear forces can potentially play a role in and exert an influence on the EC. EC Commission President Delors asked: If the EC becomes a powerful political alliance, why is it impossible to transfer nuclear weapons to the command of this political power? Some people maintain that "the road toward European unity will lead to nuclear integration." As the role of the U.S. nuclear protection umbrella diminishes, a Europe that is pursuing independent defense capabilities may pin its hopes on the nuclear forces of Britain and France.

3. New Issues in Nuclear Disarmament

Efforts by nuclear powers to restructure their nuclear strategies in the current international security situation have given rise to noteworthy new issues in the area of nuclear disarmament.

(1) The issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Unilateral actions taken by the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia)—in September and October 1991 and in January 1992—to slash their nuclear arsenals have injected new vitality into the nuclear disarmament process and mark major progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. These actions have the following implications: 1. They have shattered ideological fetters, radically reversed the slow process of nuclear disarmament, stopped the vicious circle, and quickened the nuclear disarmament process. In the words of British Prime Minister Major, President Bush's call for unilateral nuclear disarmament is "significant and imaginative." 2. Unilateral actions imply that one party takes the initiative in gradually inducing the other to take equivalent actions. Evidently, the United States took unilateral disarmament actions in anticipation of equivalent actions from the Soviet Union (Russia). These unilateral actions were not unconditional. Instead of being confined to mere political propaganda, the call for unilateral nuclear disarmament was expected to produce genuine progress if the Soviet Union

(Russia) responded in kind. 3. Unilateral and bilateral disarmament initiatives are mutually supplementary. Unilateral initiatives are particularly significant to promoting or resuming talks. After the call for unilateral nuclear disarmament was advanced, the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) immediately held consultations in preparation for further talks, and they made progress in this respect. Hence, within the framework of the current international strategic structure, mutually supplementary unilateral initiatives and bilateral actions signify the strong possibility of substantial reductions in nuclear weapons among nuclear powers.

(2) The issue on multilateral nuclear relations. During the years when the United States and Soviet Union dominated the world's nuclear undertakings, U.S.-Soviet bilateral nuclear relations occupied a leading and decisive position in all nuclear issues. The status of other countries was secondary and not given importance. Now that the situation has undergone tremendous changes, a multilateral nuclear relations has become increasingly eminent.

1. On 29 January, in a unilateral nuclear disarmament proposal, Yeltsin invited Britain, France, and China to participate in a multilateral nuclear disarmament process. Although the three countries unanimously rejected the proposal, it should be noted that with the acceleration of the nuclear disarmament process by the United States and the former Soviet Union, the pressure on the three countries will be intensified. There is a possibility for the three to be invited by the U.S. President, or jointly by the United States and the CIS (Russia), to participate in the multilateral nuclear disarmament process. China has always adopted a stand of active promotion of nuclear disarmament. In a working paper submitted to the UN Disarmament Commission on 27 April, China put forward 10 measures and six essential conditions for strengthening the international nuclear disarmament process. These measures include the convention of a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear states, on condition of the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons by countries with the largest nuclear arsenals.

2. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, multilateral nuclear relations have taken shape within the CIS. In recognition of these multilateral nuclear relations, President Bush proposed last October that he would hold talks with Gorbachev and the heads of all the Soviet republics on nuclear disarmament. In February 1992, after the U.S. and Russian foreign ministers announced that they had reached an extensive and unanimous agreement on the further reduction of offensive strategic weapons, Ukrainian President Kravchuk said: Russia has no right to represent the CIS in talks with the United States on the reduction of nuclear weapons. He favored Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Russia's holding talks together with the United States and proposed that this be treated as the first phase of multilateral nuclear disarmament talks. The talks would be joined by all nuclear states in a second phase. On 17 May, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that Kazakhstan would participate in talks on the reduction of offensive strategic weapons in the capacity of an independent partner.

On 23 May, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan signed an agreement in Lisbon affirming the START Treaty. This agreement made the four CIS nations contracting parties to the treaty, thereby converting the bilateral treaty to one that is multilateral. In addition, to prevent the proliferation of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and to ensure the absolute security of these weapons, the United States held talks with these four nations on future elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. Concerning Europe's multilateral nuclear relations, France was the first to propose that Britain, France, the United States, and Russia jointly deliberate on the issue of nuclear security in Europe. The U.S. response was initially indifferent but later became positive. Last October, Bush announced that he was willing to hold talks with the heads of Britain, France, and Russia on the early realization of nuclear disarmament. France is still actively promoting a joint deliberation by the United States, Britain, France, Russia, Byelarus, and Ukraine on the issue of nuclear security in Europe, with the emphasis on halting the proliferation of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. Multilateral nuclear relations is thus established in Europe.

4. Pakistan offered to hold talks with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and India regarding multilateral nuclear relations in South Asia. The talks were proposed to discuss issues pertaining to regional security and the denuclearization of South Asia. Because India was skeptical of Pakistan's proposal, the United States followed it up with a gesture of its own and suggested a five-nation meeting that included itself, China, India, Pakistan, and Russia. To maintain its nuclear option, India refused to join the nuclear nonproliferation regime; instead, it agreed only to bilateral contact with the United States. If India changes its attitude, a "three-plus-two" multilateral nuclear relationship—which comprises a nuclear state and nuclear threshold countries—will develop in South Asia.

(3) **The issue of banning nuclear tests.** The imposition of a complete ban on nuclear testing will gradually become the order of business as the nuclear disarmament process quickens and pressure for imposing such a ban mounts.

1. The CIS favors and endorses a complete ban on nuclear testing. The former Soviet Union unilaterally suspended nuclear testing on three occasions—26 July 1985, 19 October 1989, and 5 October 1991. The first and second suspensions lasted until 26 February 1987 and 24 October 1990, respectively, while the last one will remain in effect until 5 October 1992. The country also urged other nuclear states to follow suit, thereby increasing pressure on the latter.

2. Article 2 of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty states that if one-third of the signatory countries request amendments to the treaty, a meeting should be held to discuss the matter. By 1989, one-third of the signatory countries were calling for changing the limited ban to a complete prohibition. The signatory countries held a preparatory meeting in June 1990, and they met again in New York in January 1991 to amend the treaty. Objections raised by the United States and Britain prevented the conclusion of any agreement at the meeting. Participants in the meeting subsequently voted for

a decision authorizing the chairman to hold consultations aimed at making progress in resuming the meeting's business at an appropriate time. Though temporarily relieving pressure for a complete ban on nuclear testing, this arrangement may lead to a resumption of relevant discussions at any time.

3. Discussions will be held in 1995 to consider renewal of the "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." Failure to solve the problem of banning nuclear testing before then will directly affect the treaty's renewal. Mexico and other nonnuclear signatory countries have tied the treaty's renewal with a complete ban on nuclear testing.

The United States leads the opposition to a complete ban on nuclear testing. It has adamantly refused to stop nuclear testing, with a view to developing nuclear weapons, ensuring their safety and reliability, and assuring its own survivability. Consequently, it has come under heavy pressure to seek a complete ban on nuclear testing; other nuclear countries are also under varying degrees of pressure. It should be noted that France, which had always adopted an intransigent attitude on the issue of nuclear test bans, announced on 8 April that it would suspend nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean this year. In his letters to the leaders of various nuclear countries, President Mitterrand suggested the termination of nuclear testing. On 28 April, Yeltsin said that Russia and France would jointly pressure the United States into halting nuclear testing, adding that he would broach the matter during his upcoming trip to the United States.

(4) **The problem of preventing nuclear proliferation.** Nuclear proliferation is a phenomenon that runs counter to nuclear disarmament. While joint efforts are made in the international community to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world, prevention of nuclear proliferation becomes an imperative issue. Presently, the international community is laying stress on strengthening the mechanism of nuclear nonproliferation in preventing nuclear proliferation. 2. It tries to make all nuclear and nonnuclear countries and countries on the nuclear threshold accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, assume corresponding responsibilities and obligations, and accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's system for ensuring security and international nuclear inspections in accordance with the treaty. 2. It supports the establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones in various regions around the world and heightens the security of various countries in relevant regions so they are free from the harm of using or the threat of using nuclear weapons and are less attracted by nuclear weapons. 3. It tries to make all nuclear countries assume the obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons and of not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries or nuclear-free zones. 4. It tightens the control of the transfer of conventional weapons, which is of significant importance with the cooperation among great nations—the five permanent nations of the UN Security Council adopted the "Statement on Arms Transfer and Nonproliferation" in Paris in July 1991, the "Norms on the Transfer of Conventional Weapons" in London in October 1991, and the norms on the control of weapons of mass destruction in Washington on 29 May 1991.

Moreover, the West also has paid special attention to the problem of nuclear proliferation emanating from the CIS. About the time of the Soviet Union's disintegration, Baker made two country-wide visits to the Soviet Union with a view to preventing nuclear proliferation. The emergency measures taken by the West against the CIS sources of nuclear proliferation include: 1) Reducing and destroying its nuclear weapons as soon as possible. To this end, President Bush has twice taken the initiative to unilaterally reduce nuclear weapons. The United States even offered \$400 million to help the former Soviet Union destroy its nuclear weapons. 2) Supporting Russia's so-called "four in one" principle and urging Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan to become nonnuclear countries as soon as possible. 3) Linking political recognition and economic and humanitarian aid with nuclear nonproliferation. 4) Proposing the plan of hiring nuclear scientists from the CIS. The United States, Russia, and Germany on 17 February decided to set up an international science center in Russia that will offer nuclear scientists nonmilitary job opportunities and do everything to prevent them from participating in the proliferation of technologies of nuclear weapons, missiles, and others. The center is set to open in Moscow in June 1992. The United and the European Community have each decided to offer \$25 million in funds; Japan has offered \$20 million; and other Western countries have made offers. In addition, the West also plans to set up a center of this kind in Ukraine.

U.S., Russia Cooperate To Destroy Chemical Arms
OW3107053992 Beijing XINHUA in English
0446 GMT 31 Jul 92

[Text] Washington, July 30 (XINHUA)—The United States will provide 25 million U.S. dollars to help Russia destroy chemical weapons under an agreement signed here today.

The 25 million dollars is part of a 400 million dollar appropriation made last year by the U.S. Congress to help the former Soviet republics dismantle and destroy weapons of mass destruction.

According to the agreement signed by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood and his Russian counterpart Anatoliy D. Kuntsevich, the United States will help Russians draw up a plan for the destruction of their weapons, establish

an alarm system for detecting leaks or problems with the weapons and instruct Russian experts in the destruction of chemical weaponry.

U.S. Senate Approves Suspension of Nuclear Tests
OW0408064992 Beijing XINHUA in English
0517 GMT 4 Aug 92

[Text] Washington, August 3 (XINHUA)—The U.S. Senate today approved a nine-month suspension of all underground nuclear tests, followed by no more than 15 explosions in more than three years to determine the safety of the weapons and then a permanent prohibition on testing starting September 30, 1996.

The Senate approved the ban by 68-26 as an amendment to the energy-water development money bill.

Senate Democratic leader George Mitchell said the amendment "reflects post-cold war thinking."

The senator also said that Russian President Boris Yeltsin, under pressure from the military, reportedly has already told them they can resume testing at the end of the year if there is no U.S. response to their moratorium.

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney sent a letter to the capitol, saying that he "strongly" opposed the proposal and that "as long as we retain a nuclear deterrent, we will have to test for safety and reliability."

Cheney said if the moratorium is approved by the Congress, he will recommend that President George Bush veto the bill.

Specifically, the amendment would suspend any test of a nuclear weapon from the time the bill is signed until July 1, 1993, despite the U.S. Administration's plans for some safety testing in that period.

In the following three-plus years, the administration can undertake, with the concurrence of the congress, a total of 15 tests—no more than five a year—to determine the safety of the weapons.

After September 30, 1996, no underground tests of nuclear weapons can be held.

The U.S. House, in June, approved a one-year suspension of nuclear testing that would be lifted only if the Russians resumed testing.

NORTH KOREA

U.S. Urged To Stop Nuclear Weapons Testing

SK1208032092 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1500 GMT 11 Aug 92

[Text] According to a report, the U.S. Senate on 3 August approved a bill for suspending nuclear testing for nine months and for completely suspending testing by October 1996.

It appears, however, that Bush will veto this bill. The officials of the Defense Department are insisting on the need for nuclear testing to guarantee the safety of existing nuclear weapons and to develop new weapons.

In a letter to Congress on 4 August, Richard Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense, said that he will advise President Bush to veto the bill if Congress forwards it to President Bush. Meanwhile, Pete Williams, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, made a provocative remark that he opposes a nuclear test ban, regardless of whether it is a temporary or a total ban.

This shows that although the U.S. authorities propagandized that they are interested in the reduction of nuclear weapons while noisily talking about the end of the cold war and the arrival of peacetime, they have not, in actuality, discarded the ambition of nuclear fanatics who want to dominate the world with nuclear weapons. They do this by maintaining nuclear superiority and by driving mankind into nuclear calamities.

Today the peaceloving people of the world are persistently waging an anti-nuclear struggle in a bid to realize nuclear disarmament and to establish a nuclear-free, peace zone in many places in the world. They wish to expand this zone.

The U.S. authorities should not run counter to the just struggle of the world's peaceloving people for abolishing nuclear weapons. They should take practical steps to eliminate from the source the nuclear danger, including an end to underground nuclear testing, in compliance with the trend of the times for denuclearization.

NEW ZEALAND

Premier on Concern Over Nuclear Tests Resumption

South Pacific Sees French 'Arrogance'

BK0308075892 Hong Kong AFP in English 0728 GMT 3 Aug 92

[Text] Wellington, Aug 3 (AFP)—Any resumption of French nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll will make South Pacific nations angry, Prime Minister Jim Bolger told a news conference Monday [3 August].

"They will see it as the arrogance of a distant power, that is how it will be interpreted."

France suspended its 1992 nuclear testing programme saying it would reconsider the 1993 programme after it had seen the response of other nuclear powers.

Over the weekend Jean Lichere, head of the military applications section of France's Atomic Energy Commission, suggested in an interview the tests might resume.

Bolger said Foreign Minister Don McKinnon had written to French Ambassador Gabriel de Bellescize over the issue.

Bolger said McKinnon had expressed "our concern if the French Government was to take the advice of its military, which appears to be where it is coming from, that they should recommence testing in the Pacific."

He said New Zealand and the South Pacific Forum could see "absolutely no justification" for testing to resume.

"In fact, at a time in the world history when the major powers are seeking, and have successfully sought, to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, there seems to be absolutely no justification to go back to nuclear testing."

He said he had received no direct indication from Paris that testing would resume, but said "it seems to be a rumour that's gaining some momentum."

"We want to make certain there was no doubt whatsoever as to the view of the New Zealand government which certainly also reflects the view of the Pacific island nations."

In a statement McKinnon said he had received no confirmation that the reports on a possible resumption represented official policy.

'No Justification' of Testing Seen

BK0308085492 Melbourne Radio Australia in English 0800 GMT 3 Aug 92

[Excerpt] New Zealand has protested to France against any resumption of nuclear testing in the South Pacific. Prime Minister Jim Bolger said there was no justification to go back to nuclear testing because the major nuclear powers were reducing their arsenals. [passage omitted]

Party Backs Repeal of Ban on Nuclear Ships

LD0808101192 Melbourne Radio Australia in English 0900 GMT 8 Aug 92

[Text] Delegates at New Zealand's ruling National Party conference in Auckland have backed a proposal to open ports to nuclear powered ships. In a close vote they decided to try to restore full relations with the United States and Australia by repealing a ban on nuclear powered ships entering the nation's ports. The National Party government had said that it would wait for a report by an independent committee before making a decision on lifting the ship ban. Currently New Zealand bans all nuclear powered and nuclear armed vessels—a policy that has effectively removed it from the ANZUS defense alliance with Australia and the United States. Party official Rosemary Thomas said the vote did not challenge the nuclear-free weapons issue but it was a signal to those countries that New Zealand was prepared to stand up and be counted. She said the world was in a more uncertain position now than it had been for the past 50 years and international friends had never been more important to New Zealand.

U.S. Chemical Arms Destruction Site Termed Safe
*BK1008103492 Hong Kong AFP in English 1009 GMT
10 Aug 92*

[Text] Wellington, Aug 10 (AFP)—The U.S. chemical weapons disposal system on remote Johnston Atoll was Monday termed safe by a South Pacific Forum scientific mission.

The mission's report was hailed here by Disarmament Minister Doug Graham who said it "should alleviate concerns about environmental damage from the facility.

The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agents Disposal System (JACADS) upset the forum two years ago when biological and chemical weapons from U.S. bases in then West Germany were taken by sea to the atoll for destruction.

The atoll is 1,130 kilometres (700 miles) west-south-west of Honolulu, and to the north of the Marshall Islands and Kiribati.

The forum sent a mission comprising two scientists from Australia and one each from Papua New Guinea and New Zealand to JACADS last November.

In a report released by the forum secretariat in Suva, the mission said there was "some logic" for the facility to

continue to destroy weapons beyond the 1995 date Washington had told the forum it would close down.

The report said there was no significant regional environmental threat from JACADS, but sea air might have some effect on the facility later.

But it said the facility would in 1995 represent a "functioning proven destruction facility" and added: "There will be a degree of pressure, founded on some logic, to continue the use of Johnston Island facility to carry out a further chemical weapons destruction programme."

There was, the report said, no technical reasons why destruction should not continue there.

It noted that the old Soviet Union's stockpile of biological and chemical weapons could end up at JACADS.

If the United States decided to extend JACADS then the forum should send another mission, the report said.

Graham, in his reaction, said the report had identified a "number of encouraging aspects" of the operation, including safety measures.

He also praised the United States for its cooperation with the forum mission.

HUNGARY

British, Italian CFE Inspectors Arrive

*LD0508092192 Budapest MTI in English 1701 GMT
4 Aug 92*

[Text] Budapest, August 4 (MTI)—Foreign military inspectors arrived in Hungary for the first time since the agreement on European conventional armed forces came into effect on July 17.

They are to examine and authenticate the data provided by the Republic of Hungary, the Hungarian Ministry of Defence informed MTI on Tuesday [4 August].

In accordance with the British side's request, a mixed group—seven British and two Italian inspectors—arrived at Budapest's Ferihegy Airport with a military transport aircraft of the Royal Air Force.

The group was met by officials of the Ministry of Defence's Arms Reduction Information and Control Centre. The Hungarian officials and the delegation have begun to implement the supervision tasks set down in the agreement.

POLAND

Complaints Over Troop Withdrawals 'Unfounded'

*LD0808213492 Warsaw PAP in English 2225 GMT
7 Aug 92*

[Text] Warsaw, Aug 7—The Polish Foreign Ministry on Friday [7 August] rejected Russian claims that an officially-inspired press campaign is being conducted against the forces of the former Soviet Army still stationed in Poland.

Grzegorz Dziemidowicz, press spokesman at the Polish Foreign Ministry, said that remarks made on July 31 by the director of the Information and Press Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry were unfounded. The Russian side accused the Polish Government of orchestrating a negative campaign in the media in an attempt to speed up the withdrawal of the former Soviet Army from its bases in Poland, and rejected Polish claims that many of the Soviet bases were in a devastated condition.

"Who could interfere with the press in a democratic country, a press moreover reflecting many different political opinions?" asked Dziemidowicz. He added that press comment in Poland on the issue of the troop withdrawals was a response to public interest in the question.

Commenting on Russian criticisms of Polish actions such as the recent ban on flights out of Soviet airbases, Dziemidowicz stressed that the Polish Government had the right to operate according to its own interests on its own territory. He

added that the Polish Government accepts in full the Polish-Russian agreement relating to the withdrawal of the former Soviet forces, and was not seeking to accelerate it.

He also rejected the denial by the Russian Foreign Ministry that several Soviet bases in Poland had been devastated. He drew attention to the clause in the Polish-Russian agreement which provided for the bases to be handed over to the Poles in a fit state for use. In many cases, Dziemidowicz said, the Russians had failed to meet this requirement. He called on the Russian side to comply with its obligations under the withdrawal agreement.

In Legnica (south-west Poland) on Friday, the General Staff of the former Soviet Northern Group of forces released figures on the present state of the withdrawal from Poland. According to the Russian side, 23,231 troops of the former Soviet Army pulled out of Poland in the first 7 months of this year. A further 12,390 officers and men remain on Polish territory. In addition, 918 tanks and armoured vehicles, 166 aircraft and various other items of artillery and other equipment have also been withdrawn.

The Russian side claims that there are now no tanks or military aircraft left in Poland.

Colonel Stefan Golebiowski, press officer for the Polish Government plenipotentiary for the withdrawal of former Soviet troops, confirmed on Friday that the Polish side had verified the Russian figures.

Under the terms of the Polish-Russian agreement, all Russian combat units must be withdrawn from Poland by November 15.

Russian General Alleges Campaign Against Troops

*LD1208083592 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1700 GMT 11 Aug 92*

[Text] General Anatoliy Basov, commander of the Russian Air Force of the Northern Group of Forces, has accused Poland of unleashing a campaign to discredit the Russian troops being withdrawn from our country.

General Basov denied that there were fighter planes on Polish territory, as POLSKA ZBROJNA reported on 20 July. The Russian general declared that only military transport planes were on the territory of the Republic and that they are engaged in transporting cargo.

He did admit, however, that Poland had detained two planes at the Szprotawa airfield. In his opinion, the planes were detained on imaginary grounds; they were stopped due to suspicions that the transport planes were being used to smuggle cars. The Polish commission did not find any stolen cars, Anatoliy Basov stated.

EGYPT

Spokesman Cited on Weapons of Mass Destruction

NC0108094392 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2106 GMT
31 Jul 92

[Text] Cairo, 31 Jul (MENA)—Egypt has stressed the need to remove all types of weapons of mass destruction and for every country to comply with this measure before signing the draft international (?agreement) on eliminating chemical weapons, recently endorsed by the Geneva conference on eliminating chemical weapons.

In statements to the newspaper AL-AHRAM to be published on Saturday, Naji al-Ghatrifi, the Foreign Ministry's official spokesman, said it is not sensible for a country or group of countries to be deprived of a particular type of weapon of mass destruction, research into it, or production, while one Middle East country is the only one to possess another type.

He added that Egypt's position about the need to free the Middle East of all types of weapons of mass destruction stems from this principle.

He noted that what applies to (?every regional country) on weapons of mass destruction also applies to Israel, because it too is in the region.

Commenting about the outcome of the Geneva conference, he said that, to be fair, there should be no distinction among the various types of weapons of mass destruction, and no type should have priority over another.

The Geneva conference endorsed a draft international agreement to ban the proliferation of chemical weapons and to eliminate them in 10 (?years).

The agreement is expected to be signed at a conference in Paris in January in the presence of several heads of state.

INDIA

Chemical Weapons Convention Stand Clarified

BK0308153892 Delhi ISI Diplomatic Information
Service in English 1452 GMT 3 Aug 92

["Spokesman's response to a query on reported news item regarding signing of chemical weapons convention by India: dated 31-7-92"—ISI headline]

[Text] In response to a question regarding a news item which appeared in certain sections of the press in which it has been reported that the minister of state for external affairs, Eduardo Faleiro, has said that India is willing to sign proposed chemical weapons convention, the spokesman clarified that the report conveys a slightly incomplete picture. He referred to one of his earlier press briefings in which he has stated that India has certain reservations about the treaty.

The spokesman said that the real point is that chemical weapons convention is subject of intensive negotiations in the conference on disarmament in Geneva at the present time. As yet the adhoc committee has not taken a decision on the final shape of CW [chemical weapons]

convention. Present negotiations, in which we are playing a very active role, relate precisely to some of the concerns which were indicated to press in one of earlier briefings, after the visit of the Federal German Commissioner Holik's visit to India, in early July this year. The minister of state also mentioned some of these concerns yesterday. He said, for example, that developing countries believe that if they were to accede to CW convention, and accept verification regime that is envisaged under CW convention, their access to chemical equipment and technology for purposes not prohibited by the convention should not be subjected to additional restraints such as those existing in the form of adhoc export control regimes. India's commitment to a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons through an agreement is well known. It is in this spirit that India has always expressed the willingness to sign CW convention, but, it must fulfill these criteria. Criteria and difficulties that we still see in certain aspects of the convention are precisely subject of negotiations today in Geneva. We hope that these negotiations will result in a satisfactory treaty, which it is our long declared intention to become signatories to. We hope that as a result of these negotiations we will be able to negotiate a satisfactory treaty which will enjoy universal adherence.

ISRAEL

Impact of Senate Bill on Nuclear Testing Viewed

TA0908142492 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
9 Aug 92 p B1

[Commentary by Re'uven Pedatzur: "The Senate Signals to Israel, Too"]

[Excerpts] The bill approved this week by the U.S. Senate banning underground nuclear tests is very worrisome to President Bush, who is threatening to veto it.

The U.S. President's arguments opposing the bill are probably known to him, but from the Israeli viewpoint, the resolution heralds the beginning of a process that may have started in the western deserts of the United States, but is bound to end in massive pressure on Israel in the nuclear sphere. [passage omitted]

At present, the debate and the political struggle are confined to the U.S. arena, but it will not be long before the focus shifts to other countries with nuclear capability.

According to the outlook of quite a few legislators and their advisers in Washington, Israel is one of the problematic countries in this respect. The prevalent view—according to foreign press—is that Israel possesses a sizable nuclear arsenal, and its refusal to join the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) calls for strict action. So far, this outlook has not been put into practice, and U.S. Administrations have preferred to evade the problem, ignoring Israel's nuclear activities.

Yet the U.S. legislation, which will result in practical steps toward terminating nuclear experiments and a

drastic cut in U.S. nuclear procurement, will also open the door to pressure on Israel. As far as is known from foreign media, Israel has performed no nuclear tests. Israeli decisionmakers work on the assumption that they can preserve the blessed obscurity, which is the basis of Israel's nuclear policy.

The Senate's legislative process indicates that the Jerusalem decisionmakers should begin drafting a new and different policy. Israel has enjoyed years of grace in the nuclear sphere, but these are about to end, and only appropriate preparation will enable it to cope with the forthcoming pressures. There are diverse possibilities, and they are discussed openly in some Israeli circles. Israel can, for instance, suggest a unilateral freeze of the present situation, in return for an arrangement with Arab countries under which the current nuclear situation in the Middle East will be frozen.

Israel can also propose steps for the gradual closure of the Dimona reactor, in parallel with progress in the political process, including inspection and control arrangements of nuclear procurement. It would be a mistake to adhere to the present policy and wait for outside pressure to alter it.

PAKISTAN

Premier Discusses Nuclear-Free South Asia

BK3107060792 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 0200 GMT 31 Jul 92

[Text] Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif has said the establishment of a just, nondiscriminatory and lasting nuclear nonproliferation regime in South Asia will break new grounds in all aspects of bilateral relations. In a message to a national seminar on nuclear nonproliferation and regional approach being held in Islamabad today, Mohammad Nawaz Sharif said a positive response by India will strengthen the process of dialogue and cooperation, removing distrust and suspicion. He said Pakistan is committed to nuclear nonproliferation. He referred to various proposals made by Pakistan to India, the latest of which was about convening a five-nation conference for consultations on the nuclear issue. The proposal was accepted by the United States, Russia and China, but India's reaction was not positive.

The prime minister said the threat to international peace and stability lies largely in regional tensions and discords. The removal of the sources of these tensions through negotiations is an essential prerequisite for laying a foundation of lasting peace, stability and progress in the world.

GENERAL

Yeltsin Military Aide Volkogonov Interviewed
PM0708115892 Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA
in Spanish 2 Aug 92 p 8

[Interview with General Dmitriy Volkogonov, military adviser to President Yeltsin, by Rafael Poch in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Poch] What is Russia's gravest military problem?

[Volkogonov] The halving of our 3 million-strong Army. We wish to do so in five or six years, but it will be very difficult. It is necessary to reduce the number of officers themselves—over half a million men—and to organize their retirements, give them new occupations, and provide them with homes. We already have 198,000 unhoused officers. In order to resolve this enormous problem, I propose that our country sell around half the 40,000 tanks we have and give half the money raised by the sale directly to military personnel, so that they can purchase apartments.

[Poch] Why are you taking so long to withdraw your 130,000 troops from the Baltic?

[Volkogonov] This is 99 percent due to this housing problem. We do not know where to withdraw them to. The Baltic states should understand this. I am astonished by the toughness of their stance on this issue.

[Poch] What will be Russia's new military doctrine?

[Volkogonov] That of the former Soviet Union was quite offensive—otherwise, why so many tanks?—and we are now seeking a defensive doctrine based on being ready to defend Russia's sovereignty and being able to take part in neutralizing regional conflicts.

[Poch] Within the former USSR?

[Volkogonov] Not just that. The chance of a world war is zero, while that of regional conflicts is increasing. For that reason, in agreement with our neighbors and allies, we are organizing peacekeeping forces, as in Ossetia or Moldova, and we will take part with our contingents where the United Nations decides, as in Yugoslavia.

[Poch] The "war party" has increasing influence in the Russian state.

[Volkogonov] Yes, the conservative forces in favor of violent solutions represent a great danger. I estimate the reform's chance of success at 65 percent, against a 35 percent chance of a Thermidorian reaction. The greatest danger is that the people's patience is running out because of the deterioration in living conditions and that the national communists will succeed in bringing a million people onto the streets. If that happens, it will be a major test. The most difficult time will be in the winter—the favorable moment for a critical revolt... However, I believe that we will come through, the crisis will bottom out next year, in two or three years we will begin to surmount it, and in 10 years we will be a normal state.

[Poch] Without further coups?

[Volkogonov] I know the Army well and see no possibility. There could be local revolts and disorders aimed at involving the Army, but not a general military initiative.

[Poch] Is the tension with Ukraine over?

[Volkogonov] Ukraine means a great deal, a great deal, for Russia. We maintain an enormous interdependence which brings about good and close relations. A Slav confederation comprising Byelarus, Ukraine, and Russia will be formed 15 or 30 years hence. That is my opinion. If an agreement is reached on sharing out the Black Sea fleet and on enabling Russia to keep the bases on the Crimean peninsula, I believe that everything will be resolved.

"There Is No Nuclear Danger"

Volkogonov believes that there is no danger of lack of control over nuclear weapons in Russia. "On Yeltsin's instructions, I recently visited several nuclear installations, and the level of security at them remains as stringent as in the past."

[Poch] But Boris Yeltsin recently cited cases of corruption in the sale of arms.

[Volkogonov] Corruption exists not only in the sale of arms but in almost everything. We are a young state and do not combat it sufficiently, but Yeltsin was referring, in the first place, to nonnuclear weapons and, second, to cases of sales outside Russia, especially in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. They involve officers who lost touch with the center and unlawfully decided to sell part of the light arsenal to local guerrillas, as happened in Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Nuclear City Seeks Government Environmental Aid

PM0608101392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 0200 GMT 4 Aug 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Video report by G. Klimov and V. Shtengelov]

[Text] [Klimov] This city is a long way from Chernobyl, but radiation levels are higher than normal here. It is Ukraine's "Atomgrad," the city of Zheltyye Vody. It sprang up in the fifties on the Dnieper steppes, working to meet the defense industry's requirements. It is the only city in Ukraine where uranium is extracted and processed at the same time. Whether it was inevitable or whether it was consciously sacrificed to the higher interests of the defense industry, the fact is that radioactive waste polluted Zheltyye Vody. Moreover, no care was shown in the selection of materials for highway and housing construction—radioactive materials were used. About five years ago the asphalt was removed and sections irradiated by Gamma radiation were resurfaced. The park and the pioneer camp, along with other polluted facilities, were decontaminated, but that is as far as it went. Money is needed. The city soviet has asked the republic's Council of Ministers to grant Zheltyye Vody the status of a town in increased environmental danger.

[A.I. Shevyakov, city soviet executive committee chairman] There should be a program to provide the population with welfare and radiation protection, and we are currently working on this. It must be said outright that it will not be a

program that can be implemented in a day. It is a long-term program requiring substantial capital investment. We are now working with the government, which is giving us all-around support and assistance in implementing this program.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Arms Procurement To Stay at 1992 Level

*PM0508193092 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 31 Jul 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer and pictures of various missiles] Georgiy Khizha has stated that the military state order for 1993 will remain at the current year's level. During a press conference he singled out two key tasks of the Cabinet of Ministers in this sphere—reducing the number of military plants, and their conversion to other production.

According to military experts' opinion, strategic offensive arms can be reduced to 3,000 warheads, as agreed in Washington between the presidents of Russia and the United States, provided that there is an equivalent reduction in nonnuclear weapons, a ban on ABM defense systems, and that the corresponding arms of all the NATO countries rather than just the United States are taken into account.

According to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in the global reduction of strategic offensive arms it is necessary to proceed from the premise that the development of the means of nuclear war should be geared solely to enhancing their survival.

Flaws Seen in Articles on Arms Issues

*PM0608130992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Aug 92 p 3*

[Manki Ponomarev article: "Sometimes Discussions on Serious Things Lack Correctness"]

[Text] Media organs of various tendencies often address the problems of nuclear disarmament, the significance of which is truly momentous. Interest in these problems has increased, especially in the light of the framework accord signed by the Russian Federation and U.S. Presidents on further radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons, and also in the light of the START Treaty which marked its first anniversary a few days ago.

Among the latest items in our press on this score, two in particular have attracted attention: The article by Major General of Aviation, Retired, Boris Surikov, candidate of technical sciences, entitled "Disarm, But Sensibly," published 21 July in PRAVDA; and the article which appeared 10 days later in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA by Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Rogov, deputy chairman of the Russian Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute, entitled "Strategic Arms: The Facts and the Fiction."

Both articles raised important questions were and expressed interesting considerations, although the authors' viewpoints

vary greatly. However the matter is not about the stances adopted by B. Surikov or S. Rogov. The point at issue concerns something else altogether.

If you read the article by B. Surikov, whom the editorial office presents as a truly authoritative expert, quite frankly you will not believe it. Mistakes, deliberate or otherwise, distortions of the facts, and blatant fabrication leap off the page at you.

Let us start with the minor things. The author talks in particular about seven classes of SSBN attached to bases of the Northern Fleet. But all SSBN's relate to one class of vessel—the submarine. But they can belong to various categories. Any military person or expert should make a distinction here.

However, this kind of slip of the pen is not a tragedy. There are far worse inaccuracies than that. Describing the framework accord between B. Yelstin and G. Bush, the author claims: "In the second stage of cuts in strategic offensive weapons, Washington is to be set a ceiling of 3,500 warheads, and Moscow—3,000." This is wrong—the document states: "...will cut the overall number of weapons on each side to a level of between 3,000 and 3,500 units (as defined by each side independently)..." (In both cases, the emphasis is my own—M.P.)

The disparity between the author's interpretation and what is enshrined in the Washington accords is clear. This is not a slip of the pen, but a blatant distortion of the facts. It allows the author to complain about a retreat from the principle of equal security for each side—which in fact, it transpires, does not exist—and it allows him to stress twice over that the document on the framework accord "should not be approved," and that "in its existing form the framework agreement on START should not be ratified by the Russian Supreme Soviet." (B. Surikov's emphasis). And by the way, this is just forcing an open door. There is no suggestion of ratifying the framework agreement. Ratification will be sought for a special treaty-style document, which will stipulate each side's principled approaches to further cuts in strategic offensive weapons, as agreed in Washington.

One could also point to other errors and fabrications by the author of the PRAVDA article. For example, the allegation that long-range cruise missiles have been forgotten in Washington. Actually, a decision regarding these missiles was made in the United States back in September last year. But even what has been said so far is obviously enough to make us think: the cavalier attitude toward individual facts, and especially their distortion, undermines our belief in all of the author's claims or leads the ill-informed reader to draw knowingly false conclusions.

Unfortunately, the article by S. Rogov was not free of annoying inaccuracies either. In two places—concerning the deployment details of "Trident" system submarines in line with Ronald Reagan's program and regarding the number of D-5 missiles they should carry—he gets his figures wrong. The American "Minuteman-3" ICBM's—which in the future will actually preserve in their nose section platforms for the positioning of three nuclear units, although two of them will be removed—are described as single-warhead

missiles. There is a strange sound to the arguments about our potential for preemptive counterforce strikes, even though nobody in the CIS has abandoned the commitment not to use nuclear weapons first. It was said quite categorically that "we favor the creation of a 'global defense system,' which is very reminiscent of the Reagan SDI idea," when the fact is that we are not advocating creating a global defense system, but merely examining its possibilities.

The article also contains other slip-ups which force one to doubt that the author has any respect for his readers. Blunders, slips, and errors undermine our confidence in the ideas—which may be absolutely correct—tackled in the articles. It is difficult to begin identifying which parts are fact and which are fiction. Although, clearly, S. Rogov's enthusiasm was specifically aimed at trying to separate the wheat from the chaff.

Early Decapitation of ICBM's Urged

*MK0808070292 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Aug 92 pp 1, 2*

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Arms Control Center: "Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and the Ballistic Missiles. The Problem of the Nuclear Fuse (Zapal) in Russian-Ukrainian Relations"]

[Text] The Black Sea Fleet patrol boat that crossed over to Ukraine gave us one more reminder of the truism that if problems are not resolved they often blow up.

Everybody already knows that 27 percent of the strategic offensive forces (calculated in terms of ballistic missile warheads and bomber armament) are deployed outside Russia. Since Kazakhstan and Byelarus recently agreed to consider the strategic forces deployed in their countries Russian, the main problem that remains is the 176 ICBM's, carrying 1,240 nuclear warheads, deployed in silo launch installations on the Khmelnitskiy and Pervomaysk bases in Ukraine.

What are the legal aspects of the matter? Under the agreements reached among the CIS countries in Alma-Ata and Minsk (in December 1991) operational control [upravleniye] and material and technical support for all the strategic deterrent forces remain with the unified command of the CIS armed forces. The "nuclear button" is with the Russian president, and he is obliged to coordinate a decision to use the strategic forces with the heads of the other three republics.

Ukraine, however, does not acknowledge Russia as the USSR's nuclear successor and does not consider the ICBM's on its territory foreign. Kiev claims ownership rights to them and is prohibiting redeployment, elimination, or modernization of these missiles, their elements (the warheads, for example), or any equipment without its sanction. At the same time, although a sovereign state Ukraine lacks the physical capability to control the use of nuclear weapons from its territory.

This problem has been raised repeatedly by President L. Kravchuk in proposing to share the "button" with Moscow in order to have the opportunity to prevent the launch of

ICBM's from Ukrainian territory without his assent (in the theory, this is called negative control [kontrol]). The question also arises here of "administrative" control [kontrol] over the personnel of the two missile divisions, encompassing the Ukrainian draft, the oath, the officers' material provision, etc.

The system of controlling [upravleniye] the strategic offensive arms is, however, constructed in such a way that negative control is practically impossible to separate from positive control, by which is meant the capability of the highest command level to issue the order for a nuclear strike and to transmit it to those who are to carry it out. So in reality the sharing of the "button" between Moscow and Kiev would mean precisely the division of the former USSR's nuclear potential.

As far as the technical aspect of the question is concerned, here specialists' opinions are somewhat at odds. The tight centralization of the control [upravleniye] system and the coded key system [kodo-blokirovka] to prevent unsanctioned launch were designed to deal with the malicious or the slipshod, but not with the nationalization of the armed forces. Everyone agrees, however, that if Ukraine allocates the necessary economic and technical resources it will be able to switch the line of control [liniya upravleniya] over the missiles at the two bases from Moscow to Kiev—if not in a month, then in a year—but this depends on the loyalty of the missiles troops personnel, hence the great importance of the question of administrative control [kontrol].

Such a prospect makes the rest of the world break out in a cold sweat, and not without reason. The security and physical safety [sokhrannost] of the ICBM's deployed outside Russia and the reliable prevention of unsanctioned launch or detonation would be diminished simply as a result of technical-economic factors.

The process of further strategic arms reduction, now multi-lateral as a result of the USSR's "nuclear disintegration," would immediately enter a profound impasse: What would the comparative status of the non-Russian forces be, and how could stability be ensured? The reaction of Britain, France, and China in this event is entirely predictable: a rapid buildup of forces and no limitations because Ukraine would become at a stroke the world's third largest nuclear power with more arms than the other three put together.

However, the heaviest blow would be struck to the nonproliferation of nuclear missile weapons in the world. Then the chances of prolonging the term of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty at the conference scheduled for 1995 will be close to zero. If Ukraine can have them, then why not India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, let alone Germany and Japan?

I am far from wanting what I have said above to be taken as meaning that Kiev is now the "source of a threat to peace." The two missile divisions have been drawn into the maelstrom of Russian-Ukrainian contradictions, for which Moscow too bears its share of responsibility. Ukraine's preoccupation with questions of prestige, sovereignty, and security is a reality which cannot be ignored. Recently, thank God, Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk have reduced the

temperature of political passions and cooled down a situation which was equally disastrous for both republics.

But there are no grounds for complacency, as the incident with the patrol boat showed. Whatever may happen in the future, the nuclear missile question has to be taken off the agenda of relations between the two republics once and for all. So what is the situation in terms of the political-legal settlement of the problem?

Here too the situation is ambiguous. Under the first CIS agreements (December 1991) Ukraine pledged to assist the elimination of strategic armaments on its territory before the end of 1994. This was not linked to the implementation of the START Treaty (of 1991), which provided for the destruction in Ukraine of only part of the missile facilities (approximately 60 percent in terms of warheads). In Lisbon in May 1992 the Ukrainian side signed a protocol on eliminating all strategic arms within the framework of that treaty over a period of seven years, that is approximately by the year 2000.

Then in June 1992 the United States and Russia signed a framework agreement on a more radical strategic offensive arms reduction in the period up to 2000-2003, which provides in particular for the elimination of all multiple-warhead ICBM's (MIRV's). The missiles deployed in Ukraine, like those in Kazakhstan, are all of this type.

The point is though, that Ukraine is not bound by any commitments with respect to the new agreement. Indeed, Kiev was quick to announce the fact, especially since once again, in contravention of the provisions of the CIS founding documents, it had not been consulted on this important decision.

There is another delicate aspect: Even if the United States and Russia do ratify the 1991 Treaty (with which Ukraine is linked), what they will be implementing in practice is not that treaty but a new agreement which is to be turned into a treaty in the near future. It will set completely different final ceilings and qualitative limits to strategic offensive arms, a timetable for eliminating armaments, and rules for counting and reducing numbers of warheads—within the same deadlines, moreover, as the previous treaty.

Ratification of the new treaty will override the old one and formally annul Ukraine's commitments. Yet failure to conclude the new agreement for any reason is hardly going to mean that the 1991 treaty can still be implemented as if nothing had happened—so the effect will be the same as far as Ukrainian commitments are concerned.

Is there a solution to this conundrum? Yes there is, and it can comprise three components.

First, a strengthening of the constructive principles in Russian-Ukrainian relations apparent in the two presidents' June and July meetings, particularly in the sphere of security, military building, and disarmament. This is a subject which extends far beyond the framework of the present article, but without mutual concessions, respect, and consideration of one another's interests everything else becomes meaningless.

On the question of strategic offensive arms as such—and this is the second component—a new round of diplomacy is

needed, with U.S. participation, to extend the commitments made by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelorussia in Lisbon to the new Moscow-Washington agreement. To put off a final decision on the missile question until 2000 or 2003 (the new treaty's implementation deadline) would show an unforgivable lack of concern.

Therefore, third, it is necessary to reach agreement, at the Russian-American talks on the framework agreement, on the priority removal (by the end of 1993) from the missiles and storage under reciprocal control [kontrol] of a substantial proportion of the nuclear warheads liable to be cut, including those on MIRV'd ICBM's. A few technical measures will enable 176 "decapitated" missiles in Ukraine and 104 in Kazakhstan to be kept in combat status until the time comes for their elimination under the treaty timetable.

So that there is no discrimination between the two republics, similar measures should be adopted within a minimum timeframe with respect to the greater part of the multiple-warhead missiles in Russia—specifically the 333 ICBM's to be eliminated in the first phase of the new treaty. (By 2000 Russia can have no more than 1,250 MIRV'd ICBM warheads, which means something in the order of 65 heavy SS-18 missiles, 46 SS-24 ICBM's, and 23 SS-19 missiles out of the total of 467 such ICBM's currently deployed on its territory).

The maintenance of a stable strategic balance demands that the United States also carry out accelerated detachment and controlled storage of a comparable number of Minuteman, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, and Trident warheads. For the same reasons, all heavy bomber nuclear armament must be removed to centralized stockpiles under reciprocal supervision.

What would be the value of the measures suggested? For the United States and Russia—the maintenance of centralized control [kontrol] over nuclear weapons. Plus an accelerated lowering of confrontation levels without incurring excess expenditure on decommissioning missiles, submarines, and bombers over and above those planned. An attempt by nationalists of any kind to seize nuclear warheads would be an act of war and a violation of a number of treaties and as such would cause a clash not just with Russia but also with the United States and the entire world community. That prospect is a major [sderzhivayushchiy] factor.

Ukraine would obtain a nondestructive form of negative control over the ICBM's deployed there, since it would always be able to prevent the return of the warheads to the missiles. The question of administrative control over the personnel manning the "decapitated" missiles loses its acuteness. Ukraine will be able to accede to the nonproliferation treaty without waiting until the year 2000. Gains from the possible utilization of the warheads and missiles for peaceful purposes can be agreed on with Moscow and Washington. Finally, the presence of an American inspection team [inspektorat] would constitute the most neutral form of U.S. commitment with respect to Ukraine's security.

Most important of all, the nuclear missile fuse would be removed in timely fashion from Russian-Ukrainian relations, and we would not just be waiting for it to undermine

the security of both republics and the rest of the world, at which point it could be too late to be appointing commissions and starting negotiations.

Paper Hits Ministry Aide on START Accord
PM1108083792 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by G. Solovyev, an official of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, followed by editorial commentary under "Reverberation" rubric: "Alternatives Real and Imaginary"]

[Text] Among materials published recently on disarmament issues, the article by Major General B. Surikov, retired, "Disarm, But Intelligently" (PRAVDA 21 July 1992) stands out. This article, which frankly calls into question the accord achieved as a result of the Washington summit on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, provokes both bewilderment and alarm at the same time.

Bewilderment, because some of the author's claims clearly suggest that he has "not noticed" the most important elements of the Washington accord. Alarm, because the article seriously calls for a return to the "good old days," when the typical slogan was "arm through disarmament."

V. Varanets's article (PRAVDA 23 July 1992) is in many ways devoted to the same theme. Posing really serious questions about the ownership of the strategic forces of the former USSR following its breakup and about safeguarding nuclear security, he repeats after the author of the first article that it is necessary to disarm "intelligently" because the Americans are still our adversary—"whether a real or notional one, the future will show."

Let us start by dwelling on the most obvious factual errors which B. Surikov commits.

Without a shadow of a doubt he puts forward the following charges:

In both the first and second stage of reductions, lower levels of nuclear weapons are fixed for Russia than for the United States;

the reductions do not affect U.S. superiority in the naval and aviation components of the strategic potential; the accord does not cover long-range nuclear air- and sea-launched cruise missiles [ALCM's and SLCM's]; Russia will have to destroy a large number of missiles and submarines, thereby inflicting serious economic damage on the country.

In reality, the situation is "precisely the complete opposite."

The levels of weapons [boyezaryady] fixed for both sides in both the first and second phase of reductions are equal.

For the first stage it will be between 3,800 and 4,250 weapons for each side (as each will determine for itself). Incidentally, the first stage of reductions is to finish not in 1993, as B. Surikov writes, but seven years after the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms Reductions comes into force. If the treaty comes into force in the current year, the first stage of reductions will end in 1999.

For the second stage (the year 2003), reduction will be to a level between 3,000 and 3,500 units (as each side will determine for itself).

The framework accord commits the Americans for the first time to reducing the maritime component of their strategic offensive weapons to the level of 1,750 weapons; that is, a threefold reduction on the existing level (around 5,500 weapons) and a twofold reduction from the number they were planning to have (3,450) in the context of the START treaty signed last year.

The aviation component of U.S. strategic offensive weapons is also liable to drastic reduction. The rules stipulated in the framework accord for counting the nuclear weapons of heavy bombers will compel the United States (in order "to fall within" the established levels) to reduce their quantity of these weapons by a factor of seven to 10, whereas at present U.S. heavy bombers can technically be fitted with 6,000-7,000 nuclear weapons (and not just over 2,000, as B. Surikov claims), by the year 2003 the number of nuclear weapons on U.S. heavy bombers, according to the estimates of experts, will number between 750 and 1,250 units, depending on the composition of the entire grouping.

The problem of nuclear SLCM's was settled in September-October 1991 as a result of reciprocal initiatives by the United States and the USSR (as it was then). These weapons are to be removed from ships and submarines and either eliminated or transferred to centralized storage places. B. Surikov has evidently simply "forgotten" this.

Overall and as a whole, under the framework accord, compared with the levels Russia and the United States could have had under the terms of the START treaty, we will have to reduce our strategic offensive arms by one half, while those of the United States will have to be reduced by two-thirds.

The procedures for eliminating missiles stipulated in the START treaty (they remain in force for the framework accord also) are so flexible that in an absolute majority of cases Russia will be able to choose for itself when and how to do this. Possibly nonspecialists are led astray by the very term "elimination" [likvidatsiya], which has a very broad meaning in the context of the treaty: For example, the elimination of a missile also includes its use as a satellite launcher. The framework accord extends the meaning of this term still further. For example, applied to most types of MIRVed ICBM's (ICBM's carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles), elimination will mean reducing to one the number of warheads on the missile.

The treaty makes no provisions at all for the elimination of submarines—only the removal of missiles from them and the dismantling of the launch installations.

B. Surikov's conclusion is that "the framework agreement on strategic offensive weapons should not be ratified by the Russian Supreme Soviet." V. Varanets comes to the same conclusion. These conclusions cannot be accepted, above all because they are based on spurious information. Possibly the authors themselves were the victims of an unscrupulous source and were unable to study either the text of START or

that of the framework accord, but in that case they should not have made such far-reaching conclusions and recommendations. Not to mention the fact that the framework treaty is not liable to ratification. It will be the agreement which is elaborated on the basis of the treaty which will be liable to ratification.

There is, however, a more fundamental question. Where do the recommendations of the authors lead?

Above all to a return to the policy and ideology of confrontation with the United States and to the vehement antagonism of the two mightiest nuclear powers, to an orientation toward keeping the defense complex in its previous form and previous dimensions, and in order at least somehow to finance a new round of the arms race toward turning the country into a military camp. It was on just this path that the Soviet Union "overtaxed itself" economically and politically.

B. Surikov's reasoning is to a great extent based on the fact that Russia's strategic potential constitutes only 81 percent of the strategic potential of the former USSR, and therefore Russia finds itself in a situation known to be disadvantageous compared to that of the United States. It is difficult to argue with this, but the conclusions following from it are another matter. Obviously, following Surikov's logic, we should increase our nuclear potential to the U.S. level and only then begin talks on reductions.

(It is noteworthy that B. Surikov's complaints about the framework treaty and his recommendations coincide almost word for word with what the Pentagon has been saying recently. The U.S. military is also complaining that the reductions are too big and are also starting to talk of new weapons which could compensate for these reductions).

The framework treaty posits a different approach—to arrive at a strategic potential compatible with the U.S. potential through reductions on both sides. The agreement achieved in Washington is above all a reflection of the process of optimizing the strategic potential and adapting it to economic and political realities.

In the period from about the year 2000 to the year 2005, the operational life of all our MIRVed ICBM's will expire and these missiles will be automatically liable for elimination. At the same time, all the most modern types of these missiles are produced in Ukraine. Russia was faced with a choice—to negotiate with Ukraine for the purchase of these missiles (at what price?), to set up their production ourselves "from scratch, or, after the elimination of the obsolete missiles, not to have any more of them. The choice was made in favor of the third path.

The agreement that neither Russia nor the United States will have MIRVed ICBM's after the year 2003 in fact constitutes the nucleus of the framework treaty. In exchange for this, the United States undertook the concessions described above.

Of course, both the production and the modernization of the strategic potential will be required in the future, but they will be carried out only on the scale necessary to maintain and improve a significantly more limited potential than exists at the present time. Correspondingly, it will be possible to

reduce the dimensions of defense production also, shunting the remaining enterprises and institutions onto peaceful tracks.

The framework accord is the clearest indication that partnership in Russian-U.S. relations is not just words but reality. After all, if the United States were really seeking to obtain nuclear superiority over Russia, it would not need to conclude an agreement but simply wait until, through objective causes, we reduce our strategic offensive weapons to the same level of 3,000-3,500 weapons which we will now be attaining on a mutual basis, through equal reductions.

B. Surikov should also ponder this alternative, and more importantly, so should those to whom his recommendations are addressed.

From the Editors

B. Surikov's article, as readers will have noticed, was published under the "Opinion" rubric. Nevertheless, we consider it necessary to state the editors' viewpoint on some questions touched on in it and in the article by G. Solovyev, an official of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was sent to us in an official capacity.

We have carried out a number of consultations with the creators of the country's strategic potential and also with objective military experts truly representative of the history of the arms race and the subject of the framework accord. The conclusion: The proposed program of radical reductions in the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear potentials was hastily prepared without considering the fundamental problems which exist. Given the implementation of the ideas of the framework agreement, the principle of the equal security of the sides will be disturbed to Russia's detriment. Only given the observation of several crucial tenets of the nuclear era can the framework agreement be supported by public opinion in Russia and the other CIS countries. This applies in particular to the following.

—At the UN General Assembly's second special session on disarmament (1982) the Soviet Union undertook not to use nuclear weapons first. The United States, and also the other nuclear powers, have not made such a commitment to this day. There are 7,000 installations on CIS territory today which are still in U.S. nuclear sights, while 5,000 weapons are targeted on Russia.

In our view, cardinal measures in the sphere of Russian and U.S. strategic offensive weapons reductions should be accompanied by a special Russian-U.S. declaration not to use nuclear weapons first against one another.

—On the USSR's initiative, talks were begun in the seventies on a complete and universal ban on nuclear weapons tests. The conclusion of this treaty would prevent the creation of any new strategic or tactical nuclear weapons systems to replace the existing ones. To this day Washington has been unwilling to undertake such commitments. This is dictated by the U.S. military-industrial complex's desire to create third generation nuclear weapons possessing the property of directed energy transfer. These weapons,

unlike traditional ones, will be able to hit targets at a considerable distance from the nuclear weapon's point of burst.

- The framework accord provides for the reduction by the year 2003 (or the year 2000 if the United States is able to contribute to the funding of the destruction of Russia's strategic offensive weapons) of the sum total of each side's weapons to the level of 3,000-3,500 units.

Including tactical ammunition, the number of nuclear charges liable to elimination will exceed 10,000 units for each side. Specialists will have to deal with potentially extremely dangerous products. Thoroughly perfected technology and the very highest standards of production will be required, and a number of special enterprises will have to be launched in Russia.

During the hasty preparation of the draft framework accord this problem was inadequately researched and did not find reflection in the text of the document.

- The framework accord provides for the elimination of all land-based MIRVed ICBM's by the year 2003. In other words, G. Bush and B.N. Yeltsin agreed to implement an idea put forward by the Soviet Union as long ago as the SALT I talks (1969-1972). At that time the U.S. military-industrial complex rejected this proposal, which led to the massive emergence of MIRVed ICBM's. Today we possess three types of single warhead ICBM's and five types of strategic missiles which can carry several nuclear warheads.

Implementation of the requirements of the framework accord to eliminate this class of strategic ICBM and deploy land-based single warhead ICBM's is currently possible only if our government finds colossal resources for these purposes.

Incidentally, G. Solovyev's references to complexities connected with the fact that the most modern systems of the former Union missile might are produced in Ukraine also testify to the inadequate diplomatic analysis of the problem. Surely it is not simpler for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today to negotiate with Washington on the latter's terms than with Kiev on principles acceptable to both CIS members?

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

'Bright Future' for U.S. Weapons Scientists
PM0608074592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Aug 92 p 3

[Manki Ponomarev article: "U.S. Nuclear Scientists Still Waiting For Bright Future"]

[Text] Magic Sword Did Not Yield

The ancient legends of King Arthur say that this noble warrior won brilliant victories over his enemies thanks to the magic sword Excalibur which he pulled out of a rock with the help of wizardry. This symbolic name was used by the initiators of the SDI [strategic defense initiative] program when they dreamed of creating a wonder weapon during the years of frontal confrontation with the USSR. The idea was

to place a laser device in space which would produce powerful X-ray radiation initiated (generated) by a nuclear explosion. This radiation was to have hit missiles, warheads, and other enemy assets at a distance of thousands of miles. Work on the weapon, which was done by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under the leadership of E. Teller and L. Wood, and by staffers at the Los Alamos Laboratory and Test Range in Nevada, was code-named Excalibur and later even Super Excalibur.

The nuclear-pumped X-ray laser was long considered the heart of the SDI program. Its concept was developed during the "Dauphin," "Cobra," "Romano," "Cottage," "Gold Stone," and other underground nuclear explosions. The desire to continue these explosions unhindered was one of the main reasons behind the U.S. refusal to conclude a total nuclear test ban treaty with the USSR. One of the main reasons, but not the only one. But we will come back to this.

At the same time, development [razrabotka] of a combat chemical laser was under way. It was first tested back in 1985 at the White Sands range, when an erect stage from a Titan 2 ICBM was hit at a range of 1 km. A target missile was later successfully hit in flight. This laser was developed [sozdan] by the TRW Corporation.

Both our specialists and many U.S. specialists did not share the excessive optimism shown by SDI supporters regarding the prospects for weapons based on nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers. It has become known that their developers supplied the White House with deliberately embellished information—particularly as regards test results. Thus, the results of one of the underground tests of the Super Excalibur nuclear device were falsified.

In mid-1988 the Livermore Laboratory's official position—which was widely publicized—was that it would take five years and "just" \$1 billion to perfect the wonder weapon and give it a military potential. Only four years have passed since then, but the U.S. Department of Energy has decided to abandon its next "Greenwater" X-ray laser development test scheduled for September. Several million dollars had already been spent on preparing for this test explosion (with a yield of around 20 kilotonnes).

What had happened? The report of the cancellation of the "Greenwater" test was issued in order to show that U.S. President G. Bush's initiative regarding the limitation of nuclear tests was in operation, and that they would be held only in the interests of determining the safety and reliability of existing weapons systems, but we are really talking about the collapse of the entire program—now shown to be completely groundless—to develop [sozdaniye] a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser. So the magic sword has not yielded to the grasp of those who so passionately wanted to acquire it.

Tests To Continue Notwithstanding

No, the treasured sword has not yielded to the U.S. nuclear scientists, but they are not tearing their hair out with frustration either. They still have a bright future ahead of them. Most of them, at least, are not threatened with unemployment, since—as the well-informed CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR put it—the United States does not

intend to give up research aimed at improving existing weapons and developing new types, nor—and this should be particularly noted—does it intend to abandon research directly linked to nuclear tests.

What about the loud statements about limiting such tests? Well, statements may be statements, but business is business. Incidentally, if you are sufficiently adept it can easily be given an entirely decorous gloss.

For instance, take the thesis of the “safety and reliability of existing weapons systems.” God only knows what lies behind that. This was the thesis used by the U.S. Department of Energy—which is tasked with nuclear weapons production—to justify continuing research. In the sphere of improving the heat resistance of warheads, for instance—so that they can withstand high temperatures without any damage to their “contents.” But how can the correctness of this course be verified so as to ensure that there are no mishaps, as was the case with the X-ray laser? Very simple. Hold another explosion at the Nevada test range and see what happens.

But concern about weapons reliability is just the tip of the iceberg. Let us listen to John Birely, U.S. deputy defense secretary for nuclear power, who was quoted in THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. “There will still be a need for nuclear weapons in the future,” he categorically proclaimed. Some of the types whose plans are currently at the examination stage were named. These include a nuclear-tipped precision antimissile missile and a missile designed to destroy targets located deep underground.

Sources also report that new high-precision and high-speed air-launched missiles are under development. In addition, preparations are under way for the development of a strategic and tactical nuclear weapon designed to destroy enemy communications systems and electronics by producing a strong electromagnetic pulse in the wake of a nuclear explosion tens or even hundreds of kilometers above the earth's surface.

I can foresee objections—what kind of prospects can there be for U.S. nuclear scientists if the scale of research and development on nuclear weapons is being cut back and the number of personnel employed in this work will have fallen almost by a quarter in the 1987-1993 period because of retirements?

Well, the scale of research and development on nuclear weapons in the United States has indeed been reduced somewhat—above all in connection with the elimination of areas that, on examination, proved to be unpromising, or the winding up of other areas which did not have a tangible impact. Personnel are being cut back too, but three-quarters of the previous number of nuclear scientists continue to be hard at work. Quite honestly, this is a fairly sizable number when you recall the gigantic size—even by U.S. standards—of the complex for the development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons, and the huge amounts of funds which continue to be allocated for these purposes.

No, U.S. nuclear scientists have no reason to be pessimistic. They will not be left without work or wages—and good wages at that, incidentally. But will this make the rest of mankind

more optimistic? All the more so as experience demonstrates that failures such as the confusion over the Super Excalibur project are not a very frequent phenomenon in America. They know how to achieve their goals.

Necessity of Global Protection System Viewed

*PM1008145392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Aug 92 p 3*

["Opinion" article by Sergey Blagovolin and Ilya Surkov, president and vice president, respectively, of the Institute of National Security and Strategic Research: "Is a Global Protection System Necessary?"—first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already published several articles dealing with problems associated with studies of the possibility of creating [sozdaniye] a system for global protection against limited strikes by ballistic missiles. Different views have been expressed, and different approaches toward this idea have been advocated. The authors of the article we publish today substantiate their own point of view.

The Washington accords between the presidents of Russia and the United States contain an element which, against the background of the decisions to reduce nuclear arsenals, has attracted relatively little attention. Nonetheless, in our view, it is of absolutely exceptional importance. This element is the joint statement on pooling the two countries' efforts with a view to developing [razrabotka] the concept of a global protection system [GPS] against "limited" missile threats as part of a joint strategy regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and mass destruction weapons.

We know how many negative appraisals have been made of the very idea of such a system and what arguments have been advanced against it. We have no intention of doubting the sincerity and purity of intent of the GPS' opponents. We do think, however, that they fail to give adequate consideration to the ongoing changes in the world situation, changes which demand a fundamental reappraisal of the entire problem.

First of all, the nature of relations between Russia and the United States is undergoing radical change. There are signs of a clear transition to relations of partnership and, in the long term, to relations of alliance. Consequently, the ideas of reciprocal threat and of strategic stability based on nuclear deterrence are beginning to recede into the past. Moreover, the issue concerns a system meant to protect against limited missile attack. Even if it is created, it will of course be unable to undermine the overall parity which is still being retained in general terms—at least until such time as the evolution of relations renders such parity altogether pointless. Regarding this "limited" threat itself, it has already become a reality and is growing fast. It is also self-evident that scientific and technical progress cannot be halted. If an opportunity has now emerged to acquire truly effective means of protection against this threat, it is necessary to create such means.

There are other highly convincing arguments in favor of joint efforts along this avenue. The creation of a GPS is becoming topical from the military viewpoint. It is highly regrettable

that the process of the proliferation of mass destruction weapons has become an accomplished fact. Essentially, we can only guess at how many countries will possess such weapons in a few years and how prepared they will be to launch these weapons without hesitating for too long. As a rule, the critics of the GPS idea argue against it by citing the efforts to tighten the nonproliferation regime. In fact, however, the GPS idea must become an immutable component of this regime.

There is no doubt that this regime must be improved. It is, however, necessary to "come down to earth" in this process, to the world of harsh realities. First, any efforts along traditional lines—monitoring of technology transfer, opportunity to apply sanctions, etc.—can change things only subject to one condition: Provided there are concerted actions by all countries which could, to varying degrees, promote the proliferation of nuclear and missile weapons. It would be a sign of utmost naivety to expect this in today's conditions. Second, in practical terms it would already be too late to apply sanctions against some countries. This is why the actual creation of an effective GPS, in combination with the remaining mighty Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals, will be both an important new element in strengthening the nonproliferation regime (through reducing the incentives for acquisition of nuclear weapons) and a realistic guarantee against the non-use of such weapons by countries which already possess them or are about to acquire them.

The military-political importance of the creation of a joint GPS cannot be overestimated, either. One of the arguments adduced by its critics is the claim that work on this system could be perceived as an attempt to form a kind of U.S.-Russian condominium. It seems to us that this argument overlooks the following fact. Many countries—and not just in Europe—are already expressing great interest in the GPS. The Washington statement makes it clear that the actual involvement by allies and other interested states is conceived from the very beginning as an important element of the entire process. Thus, the GPS is conceived as a multinational program although, by dint of perfectly understandable considerations, it is the United States and Russia that will have to play the leading role.

The creation of such a system will be a most important practical step toward interdependence in the military sphere. We wish to emphasize actual interdependence, not Russia's unilateral dependence. In combination with the entire process of perestroika of military policy both in our country and in the West, the emergence of such a perfectly tangible and substantial element, shared by Russia and its partners, will no doubt occupy a noteworthy position in formulating their new approach toward defense problems, not only compatible but also complementary.

Another consideration concerns the future of Russia's military industry. It is going through hard times. Conversion is progressing chaotically, involving major losses of things that should not be lost. Optimizing the scale of defense production in the new conditions does not at all mean that there is no need to think about preserving a military-industrial potential capable of responding to the challenges of the times. Thus, large-scale projects like the GPS offer one

possible avenue for future development. The implementation of this project will also mean exchange of technologies with Western countries (even though limited, of course, within a certain framework—which is normal practice even for NATO countries). Russia has plenty to offer—the West is interested in many of our technologies—and there is plenty it can receive in exchange. Of course here, like in everything else, we need a sensible and considered approach; it is important "not to sell off too cheaply." This question concerns not the idea itself but its implementation. Let us note by the way that the frequently adduced argument that the GPS' creation is something akin to a joint conspiracy by the two countries' military-industrial complexes sounds somewhat strange. After all, literally all countries in the West, as well as Russia, are significantly reducing both military expenditures and military production volumes. Nobody intends to change this trend in the foreseeable future, but it is easy to imagine the potential cost of ignoring the new threats, of failing to adopt measures to counter them right now, if one of the worst case scenarios for the development of events were to become reality.

Finally, one special problem—the future of the ABM Treaty. One gets the impression that the treaty's preservation in its present form has become a goal in itself for some people both in Russia and in the West. The treaty was signed during the "cold war" and reflected the realities of that time. From our point of view, it has almost completely served its purpose in its present form. We advocate the introduction of amendments to the treaty which would make it possible to eliminate a series of restrictions which no longer meet the demands of the times specifically regarding testing of individual ABM defense components. The ABM Treaty cannot be a sacred cow in the sense that it cannot be reviewed. Its value, like the value of any similar agreement, is determined only by whether it strengthens real security or not. It is a different matter that caution, stage-by-stage approach, and thorough elaboration of each stage are needed.

But all this is by the way. Regardless of any decision on the ABM Treaty question, we believe that the creation of the GPS through joint efforts by the United States, Russia, and other countries is inevitable. It will be a logical extension of the process of cooperation between them, which has finally become a reality. It is self-evident that we mean cooperation based on fully equal rights. This must be understood also in the West.

Report on 'Doveriye' Joint ABM Research Project

*LD0808223692 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 8 Aug 92*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The two military superpowers, 20 years after the conclusion of the first ABM treaty, have reached an agreement on jointly creating a defensive antimissile umbrella over the earth, taking account of the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to third countries. Russia's contribution may be very considerable. Our correspondent received permission to speak about a sensational development by our scientists.

[Correspondent A. Galinin] The ABM Treaty of 1972 provided for the creation of a safety umbrella over just one area in the USSR and the United States—either over the capital or over the zone where strategic missiles were based. Our leaders naturally preferred to defend Moscow, that is, themselves. The Americans began to construct the anti-missile defense zone around, as the saying goes, the executioner's sword. The elements of the Moscow anti-missile band—cyclopean globes and strangely shaped gigantic buildings—can be seen even from the train in the environs of Naro-Fominsk, Kubinka, and Sofrino. That is the antennae of early warning attack detectors. It was intended to bring the target down by special anti-air missiles, but scientists here in our country and in America went further. They experimented with lasers, neutron beams, and ultra-high frequency emission generators capable of enveloping any object flying in the atmosphere in a plasma cocoon.

[R.F. Abramenko, academician at Russian Academy of Natural Sciences] With an instrument in your hands such as a guided plasmoid, the flight dynamics of any object in the atmosphere becomes within reach, first of all, not of the pilot, but of the person who is arranging the environment in the flight path of the plane or missile. You are the one, here on Earth, who is arranging it. The missile can be deflected from the target and the plane may be turned vertically to its course. Then the force of inertia would simply destroy it. In all honesty, it should be said that our scientists and design engineers from the (Wimpel) corporation did not go any further than experiments. It was necessary to observe the ABM Treaty.

Now that we are no longer enemies, it has been decided to jointly carry out full tests with the Americans. An understanding on this was reached recently. The project is called *Doveriye* [Trust], and the sides are now engaged in seeking sources of finance, all the more so since besides protecting from nuclear attack, the guided plasmoids are capable of mending the ozone hole, reducing the amount of fuel used by civilian aviation, clearing the near-Earth orbit of space garbage, and much more.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Army Missile, Artillery Chief Deplores SS-23 Elimination

PM0508142792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Aug 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel General Nikolay Mikhaylovich Dimidyuk, chief of Ground Forces Missile Troops and Artillery, by Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Dokuchayev; date and place not given: "Look After the Cadres and the Missiles Will Take Care of Themselves"]

[Excerpts] Nikolay Mikhaylovich Dimidyuk was born in Aleysk, Altay Kray, in 1937. He joined the Army in 1954. After graduating from the Sumy Artillery College in 1957 he served in various command and staff posts in many parts of the country. He is a graduate of the Military Artillery Academy and the General Staff Military Academy. He was

appointed chief of the Ground Forces Missile Troops and Artillery in October 1991. He is a colonel general.

It seems that quite recently we were extensively celebrating the 600th anniversary of our artillery. It is now exactly 10 years since 2 August 1982. What is life like today for the Russian gunners' successors? What position does this—the oldest combat arm in the Russian Army—find itself in? Our interlocutor began by answering these questions. [passage omitted]

[Dokuchayev] Nikolay Mikhaylovich, you are understandably proud of your combat arm. But does the term "missile troops" apply to it following the destruction of the OTRK-22 "Temp" [SS-12] and OTRK-23 "Oka" [SS-23] operational-tactical complexes?

[Dimidyuk] Experience of localized wars, exercises, and research shows that the proportion of missile troops used in the effective engagement of the enemy has risen steadily, and this trend will be maintained, in my view. Under the terms of the INF Treaty the "Temp" and "Oka" complexes have been scrapped. And, in our view, unjustifiably so in the latter case, since the missile's range did not exceed 500 km—and the treaty covers missiles with a range of 500-5,000 km. It should be said that whereas the "Temp" operational-tactical missile was designed solely for a nuclear attack on the enemy, the state-of-the-art multirole "Oka" operational-tactical missile was designed for both the nuclear and conventional roles, and had no counterpart anywhere in the world. Its scrapping has deprived the Ground Forces of a precision long-range weapon.

Nonetheless, you cannot claim that the scrapping of the "Temp" and "Oka" operational-tactical missiles has left the Ground Forces without any missiles. Yes, our firepower has been reduced. But we have been able to maintain the basis of the missile troops—highly trained professional missile cadres. Tactical exercises involving combat launches of missiles confirm this—85 percent of launches this year were assessed as "excellent" or "good." The missile troops continue to rehearse offensive strikes in an electronic countermeasures and air defense penetration environment. Missile brigade specialists in the North Caucasus and Moscow Military Districts have been well trained. I am sure that in the future precision automated missile and rocket [reaktivnyy] systems will play a considerably bigger role in effective engagement than is the case today.

[Dokuchayev] You claim that your combat arm has a future. But the Gulf War showed that air power dominated in combat operations.

[Dimidyuk] In my view, it would be wrong and misguided to assess the development of different combat arms from the standpoint of the Gulf War experience. Air power was, indeed, widely used. But what were the conditions like? Almost ideal—no air defense countermeasures from Iraq, good weather conditions, open terrain... Yet, even so, obsolete R-17 missile complex missiles—called "Scuds"—hit their targets (68 percent), penetrating the multinational forces' state-of-the-art air-defense countermeasure (the Patriot).

And then the concluding chapter in the war was written not by air power but by ground forces, which made extensive use of such powerful weapons as the MLRS multiple-launch rocket system and 155- and 203-mm guns. Any war is a testbed—the Gulf War particularly so. And the Americans made use of this—they held combat tests for the first time of the new ATACMS missile complex (close in terms of its performance to our “Oka” operational-tactical missile). [passage omitted]

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

U.S. Inspection of Air Regiment in Ukraine

LD2507172892 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in English 0000 GMT 25 Jul 92

[Text] According to the press center of Ukraine's air force today a military inspection group arrived in Kiev headed by the U.S. representative (Ilyak Koch). Today and tomorrow it will inspect one of the air force regiments of Ukraine. The inspection is being carried out within the framework of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armaments in Europe.

Polish Reports on Russian Troops Criticized

'Epidemic' of 'Unsubstantiated Reports'

PM0708092592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Aug 92 First Edition p 7

[Report by V. Yelagin, adviser to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Information and the Press, under the “Diplomacy” rubric: “Who Stands To Gain From This?”]

[Text] The Polish mass media have again focused attention in recent times on the problem of the withdrawal of Russian troops. The relocation of all the combat units of the Northern Group of Forces [NGF] to Russia is expected before 15 November this year. In this respect, any constructive proposals on the implementation of the plan agreed by both sides would be extremely apposite.

Unfortunately, instead of advice, demands to accelerate the withdrawal of our troops are deliberately being advanced yet again and unsubstantiated accusations of unlawful actions by NGF servicemen are being made. Judging by Polish press reports, these accusations are reaching virtually epidemic proportions. Our soldiers and officers, it is claimed, are squandering property and military equipment, handing over military facilities in a poor state, and engaging in illegal operations in order to circumvent customs regulations. The list of these “misdemeanors” on the part of the Russian military, according to the Polish account, could be extended.

Of course, it is impossible to fully rule out incidents of this type. They should be decisively nipped in the bud, and the appropriate investigations carried out. However it would be silly, to say the least, to present all NGF servicemen only in the role of speculators and money-grubbers.

The measures being taken by the Polish authorities aimed at banning precautionary monitoring measures at a number of

NGF military facilities, transport aviation flights from a number of air bases, and the setting up of posts round Russian military units look irregular, in our view.

In addition, it is impossible not to mention the many incidents with regard to Russian servicemen with manifestly provocative intentions or the throwing of stones at Russian military convoys in transit through Poland. I think that the present campaign in the Polish mass media over the withdrawal of Russian troops is not coincidental.

What is the reason for the Polish side's attempt to exacerbate relations?

The impression arises that certain circles in Warsaw are fueling a hostile attitude on the part of the Polish population to the Russian military in an attempt to cover up their own faults regarding the nonfulfillment of mutual agreements on the withdrawal of Russian military units, and here many complaints can be made against the Polish side.

Now is not the time for mutual recriminations or insults. The main thing is to implement the accords reached with Polish Republic President L. Walesa during his official visit to Moscow. The talks with him finally broke the deadlock in this difficult problem in Russian-Polish relations. For its part, the Russian leadership intends to continue to firmly and rigorously observe the established time frames for the withdrawal of the troops. With this purpose in mind, a large group of skilled military specialists, diplomats, and economists has been put to work. Their only “weapon” in overcoming difficulties which arise is the path of compromises and disentangling the problems.

I think that we are entitled to expect the same attitude from the Polish side.

Polish Reportage 'Blatant Deception'

PM1108090192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Aug 92 p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Aviation Anatoliy Basov, commander of the Northern Group of Forces Air Force, by correspondent Aleksandr Bugay; place and date not given: “Northern Group of Forces: Troop Withdrawal. What Is True And What Is Lies”—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] According to schedule, all Northern Group of Forces [NGF] aviation units were to have left Poland by 15 November. Over the last few months aviation garrisons have found themselves prey to the close, biased attention of the Polish press, which has often raised problems pertaining to the Russian troop withdrawal in an unobjective and distorted way. Our correspondent Aleksandr Bugay put the question of what is true in these articles and what is lies to Lieutenant General of Aviation Anatoliy Basov, commander of the NGF Air Force.

[Bugay] POLSKA ZBROJNA told its readers that the official figures which the Russian side had submitted regarding the withdrawal of all the NGF aviation subunits from Poland contravene the figures provided by the office of the Polish

Government's plenipotentiary representative for the Russian troop withdrawal. People are saying that there are still 21 Russian Air Force combat aircraft in Poland. But KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported 11 July this year that the last aviation regiment had been withdrawn from Poland. What do you think about the article?

[Basov] This is blatant deception. There are no combat aircraft on Polish territory. The office of the Polish Government's plenipotentiary representative for the Russian troop withdrawal was well aware of this. There is only military transport aviation on Polish territory, aviation engaged in transporting authorized property.

We have the following transport aviation left: four An-12's, five An-26's, and two Mi-8 helicopters. Admittedly, Il-76's are being used to remove large-scale freight on our application. Due to the Poles' whims, two of them have been standing idle at the airfield in Szprotawa for two weeks. There is no need to tell you the losses that the Russian Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation as a whole have sustained as a result. An Il-76's freight turnover represents profit, big bucks, which Russia has lost because of the Poles.

I would point out that aviation has been delayed on a trumped up excuse and that this contravened the accords between our countries. The reason for the ban was the more than trumped up charge leveled at the command of the group of forces of allegedly smuggling out automobiles from Polish territory using transport aviation.

As a gesture of goodwill by the Russian side, and by way of an exception, the NGF commander agreed to a mass examination of Russian citizens' private property at the military camp adjacent to the Legnica airfield. The Polish police found no stolen automobiles.

As for the specific article in the Polish newspaper, I regard it as part of the Polish side's campaign to discredit the Russian troops being withdrawn from Poland.

Further on Latvian-Russian Troop Withdrawal Talks

Latvian Government Decision

*LD0908054992 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1730 GMT 5 Aug 92*

[Excerpt] At today's sitting of the Latvian Government the first questions were connected with the presence of the Northwestern Group of Russian troops in Latvia. A resolution was passed on the liquidation of the Zvarde aviation range and Adazi artillery range. This resolution will be an important document at the Latvian-Russian talks on the Army withdrawal. Moreover, it will provide grounds for the beginning of recultivation of the rather large area.

Likewise, alterations and supplements to the land reform legislative acts which are to be applied to the areas occupied by the Army were approved in order to be able to enumerate and control the material assets which the Armed Forces under Russian jurisdiction take out of Latvia.

The procedure of removing assets was also approved. The statute on the entry, stay in the Latvian territorial waters,

internal waters and harbors as well as departure from them of warships of foreign states was also adopted. [passage omitted]

Progress Seen in Riga Talks

*OW1108194192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1833 GMT 11 Aug 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A session of the Latvian delegation at the negotiations with Russia was being conducted on Tuesday [11 August] in Riga. The session is to consider a proposal of the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on withdrawal of forces in 1994 under certain provisions.

In his interview with the newspaper "Diena" the leader of the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs Indulis Berzins declared that progress was gained by the date itself - before 1994. Berzins assessed the proposals of the Russian Minister "as unconcrete and chaotic, for example on human rights". According to the Latvian parliamentarian, "these issues must be solved not due to the fact that Russia or European structures are demanding this issues to be solved but because we are a civilized country".

Kozyrev Meets With Baltic Foreign Ministers on Troop Withdrawal

Foreign Ministers 'Satisfied'

*LD0608175192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[ELTA special correspondent Balys Bucelis report from Moscow]

[Text] The meeting of the foreign ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Russia has ended. The Lithuanian delegation was led by Algirdas Saudargas, Latvia by Janis Jurkans, Estonia by Jaan Manitski, and Russia by Andrey Kozyrev.

Issues concerning the future development of mutual relations, in particular the withdrawal of the troops of the former Soviet Union currently under Russian jurisdiction from the territories of the Baltic states, and issues which reciprocally are of interest to all those states were discussed at the two-hour meeting. The official stance of Russia on these issues was presented by Andrey Kozyrev.

Journalists were not allowed at the meeting. However, the text disseminated during the meeting—according to most observers who were present—allows one to draw the conclusion that Russia is looking for a compromise in its relations with the Baltic states, yet raises a considerable number of conditions with which—again according to the opinion of observers—the governments of the Baltic states would hardly agree.

However, speaking at a news conference held after the meeting, all the ministers said that they were satisfied with the results of the meeting. Later, each of them said that the stance of the countries could be exacted later. Probably this

will be done later today, for example, during a joint dinner or during the possible meeting of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian foreign ministers.

Kozyrev's 'New Approach' Cited

*LD0608185292 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1400 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Correspondent G. Batiyev report; from the "Novosti" newscast, presented by Pavel Ogorodnikov]

[Text] [Ogorodnikov] At Andrey Kozyrev's initiative, a meeting between the ministers of foreign affairs of the Baltic countries and Russia is taking place in Moscow today. According to ITAR-TASS, the head of the Russian foreign political department has put forward a comprehensive new approach to solving the problem of troop withdrawal and normalizing all sides of cooperation.

[Batiyev] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has held a meeting with his counterparts from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in order to settle a number of issues related to the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries' territories and the living conditions of the Russian-speaking population there.

As Kozyrev said before the meeting, the Russian side intends to propose a number of specific initiatives that would help to channel the development of events toward true good-neighborliness, but this is not an easy task.

The Baltic countries are demanding that the troops be withdrawn completely and as soon as possible. Algirdas Saudargas, head of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, said before the meeting that his country intended to insist that the troops be withdrawn in 1992.

In addition, the Russian leadership is concerned over the situation of the Russian-speaking population owing to laws on citizenship and language that have been adopted in the Baltic republics. Estonia's territorial claims to a number of oblasts that belonged to it before 1940 were discussed at the meeting.

In its turn, Russia put forward a proposal on a phased withdrawal of troops to be completed by 1994 and called on the Baltic states to ensure a legal status for the units to be withdrawn and provide them with proper accommodations.

[Ogorodnikov] Despite the ministers' statement to the effect that headway has been made in solving the problem, observers point to the insufficient flexibility of the position taken by the representatives of the Baltic countries and see aggressive nationalism as the main cause of interstate divisions.

Baltic Foreign Ministers View Talks

*LD0608201892 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1700 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Excerpts] The foreign ministers of the Baltic states have met Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in Moscow. [passage omitted]

Estonian Foreign Minister Jaan Manitski told the Baltic News Service that at today's meeting the question of the territories under dispute between Estonia and Russia were discussed. Both sides noted that their positions are based on the CSCE Final Act and international agreements. Unfortunately, regarding the question under discussion, Russia and Estonia are interpreting the CSCE Final Act differently, Manitski noted.

In the opinion of Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans, the main purpose of the talks is for the ministers to agree on a schedule for the withdrawal of troops which will satisfy all sides. If this step is accomplished then this will be a turning point in relations between Russia and the Baltic states, he noted.

We intend to acquaint ourselves with the schedule for the withdrawal of troops proposed by Russia because we regard Russia's intentions as serious, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas said.

According to Estonian Foreign Minister Jaan Manitski, a speedy, well organized, and complete withdrawal of foreign troops is necessary, and work in this direction will be continued.

In the document which includes the proposals by the Russian side, speedy and effective measures are mentioned to ensure equal rights and to protect the rights of ethnic Russians and persons of all nationalities in the Baltics. Among other things, there is talk of the need to change the laws which restrict the rights of the Russian-speaking inhabitants. [passage omitted]

Further Reaction Noted

*LD0608193192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1800 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Excerpts] The foreign ministers of the Baltic states met in Moscow today with their Russian counterpart Andrey Kozyrev. [passage omitted]

Speaking at a news conference that was held after the meeting, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas gave a positive evaluation of the fact that Russia has officially proposed a date for the withdrawal of the troops and conditions related to this. All this will be carefully examined.

Estonian Prime Minister Jaan Manitski recalled the Helsinki summit Political Declaration, where the necessity to withdraw foreign troops from the Baltic states was recorded.

Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans described the presence of the Russian troops in the Baltic states as a destabilizing factor. However, at the same time he said he is pleased that the process of achieving a concrete solution to the problems had already started.

The ministers pointed out that the breakthrough in relations between the Baltics and Russia would be decided by the results of the summit, preparations for which have already started.

Kozyrev Views Talks

*LD0608203292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Text] On 6 August in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev met the foreign ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Here is our special correspondent Andrey Zenkov:

[Zenkov] The main goal was to prepare for a summit between the four countries' presidents. Andrey Kozyrev said that this was achieved. The priority issues were also determined: human rights—including of national minorities, the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic countries, protection of democratic freedoms in all four states.

[Begin Kozyrev recording] Our position is—and I think that my counterparts agree with me—that until a radical improvement takes place in our relations, Russia should refrain from subjecting these issues to political scrutiny at ministerial level, if I can put it that way, and work to expedite a summit meeting between the leaders of our states. President Yeltsin is ready for this. It will be aimed at achieving a breakthrough in our relations and we can always continue to fine-tune and work on the small print of the agreements. We believe that this is in the material interests of all four states and that the misunderstandings and difficulties that appeared between us are unnatural. [end recording]

[Zenkov] Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans hailed the outcome of the Moscow talks and commented that the crucial moment in relations with Russia could well be agreement on a timetable for a troop withdrawal signed by the presidents. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas noted, however, that his country has proposed such a timetable but it has not yet been agreed. So once again, all hopes are on a top-level summit.

Estonian Foreign Minister Hits Russian Initiatives

*OW0608205492 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1822 GMT 6 Aug 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In an exclusive interview for BALTFAX, the Estonian minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Jaan Manitski, expressed criticism of some of the provisions in the Russian initiatives expressed by his Russian counterpart Andrey Kozyrev during their meeting Thursday [6 August].

In the opinion of Mr. Manitski, Andrey Kozyrev's proposals regarding alterations of the certain provisions of the Estonian legislation are not subject to bilateral discussions. Such changes could only be addressed in the framework of the international process, for example, the Helsinki process, with the participation of international experts.

Mr. Manitski believes it would be unacceptable to discuss any possibilities for preserving any installations on the territory of the Baltic states after the troops withdrawal, for

it would run counter to the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement providing for complete withdrawal of the Russian troops.

The Estonian foreign minister emphasized that the Russian-Estonian border, as outlined by the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty and defined as such in the Estonian Constitution, is the only internationally acknowledged border between the two countries, therefore the options for its changes should be addressed in the framework of separate talks.

Mr. Manitski said that this stand of the Estonian side was presented to Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev during their bilateral meeting following the official talks.

As a whole, Mr. Manitski noted the import of that meeting for defining the positions of the sides. In his words, it would be too soon to finalize the Russian proposals, considering they will be analyzed by the governments of the Baltic countries. He also remarked that the Baltic foreign ministers' work with the Russian proposals was obstructed by the fact that they received them only on the day of their meeting with Andrey Kozyrev.

Mr. Manitski is hopeful that a meeting of the Estonian and Russian government leaders for the discussion of the issues which present mutual interest to both sides could be arranged within a month.

'Pressure Tactics' Deployed

*PM0708083592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Aug 92 pp 1,3*

[Vladimir Yermolin report: "Baltic Countries: Pressure Tactics"]

[Text] The meeting in Moscow between the heads of the foreign policy departments of the Baltic countries and Russia, which began 6 August, should determine the framework for a civilized solution to the problem of withdrawing Russian forces from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The Russian side is undoubtedly hoping that the Baltic states realize that to move the entire Baltic military force to Russia overnight—as some politicians are demanding—would mean creating intolerable conditions for military personnel and servicemen's families. Specifically, Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, first deputy chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, said the following on this matter to an ITAR-TASS correspondent: "If the leaders and parliaments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia really want to speed up the process of withdrawing the troops, they should think about what realistic assistance they could offer to Russian troops in establishing the necessary infrastructure at the site of their new deployment. We are mainly talking about participation in the construction of housing for the families of officers and warrant officers."

A civilized way of dividing up interests is thus being proposed. The approach, as is customary among sovereign states, is based on mutual advantage. However, it is perfectly clear that a quite different approach is becoming more widespread in the Baltic countries today. I would call this approach "pressure tactics," the essence of which is simple—gradually, step by step, Russian servicemen are being made

to live in literally intolerable conditions, and the fundamentally necessary activity of military units and subunits is being obstructed.

Some recent examples. The Latvian Council of Ministers has made a decision to ban Russian troops from using three training grounds effective 1 October. In Lithuania servicemen are having problems getting food; opportunities to use local stores have been restricted. However, it is in Estonia that "pressure tactics" are really thriving. Here it may be said that the Russian soldier is quite openly being prodded away with a buttstock. The chronicle of armed attacks on Russian military subunits numbers more than 40 incidents in the last three months alone. The latest was the seizure of Sauga military airfield by a group of fighters from a battalion from Parnu. What is the point of the decision by the Estonian leadership instructing Russian servicemen not to move outside their unit except in groups of at least 10 men accompanied by an officer who has appropriate permission from the Estonian administration? Bans on the unauthorized movement of motor vehicles and other hardware outside their unit, and on the movement of warships outside the waters of Tallinn naval base are in a similar vein. The following conclusion can be drawn from all this: The Baltic countries believe that Russian troops can now be pushed off their territory without excessive diplomacy just by creating unacceptable living and service conditions for them.

It seems that the example set by their "elder brothers"—the member-countries of the Warsaw Pact, which has now sunk into oblivion—has not escaped the Baltics either. All sorts of promises can be made, and then debts to Russia are "renege" at a later stage, but it is also possible to get by without promising anything at all. Until now, at any rate, Russia has allowed itself to be both deceived and thrown out on its ear. It does not look as if the Baltic countries are in the mood to conduct a dialogue with us on equal terms. Let us hope that the present meeting in Moscow will allow Russian troops to withdraw from the Baltic in a civilized manner.

Landsbergis Discusses Talks

*LD0808044192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1600 GMT 7 Aug 92*

[Text] A statement made by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council, has been disseminated by the public relations group of the Supreme Council Information and Analysis Center. It reads:

[Begin quote] On 6 August this year a document on the relations of the Baltic states and Russia was handed in to Algirdas Saudargas, Lithuanian foreign affairs minister, by Andrey Kozyrev, foreign affairs minister of the Russian Federation.

This document—which has not been signed by anybody and has no title—has been commented on in the world as the presentation of Russia's conditions which the Baltic states should comply with if the Baltic states want the Russian troops to withdraw in 1992-1994.

This impression is not entirely right, Vytautas Landsbergis said; Russia understands very well that it has to withdraw its troops from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia without any

preconditions. Only this is the best way to discontinue the illegal presence of these troops on the territory of the three Baltic states, which is unacceptable without the consent of the three Baltic states as this has been stated recently at many international forums.

The presented document is not an ultimatum. Russia's wishes are presented in it, as for example, to amend the laws of the Baltic states which could be described as an interference into the internal affairs of other states, as a pressure and a demand. The desire to continue the deployment of the Russian strategic installations on the territory of the Baltic states runs counter to the political declaration of the 10 July Helsinki summit, which advocates for undelayed and complete withdrawal of these troops.

Besides, Russia is well aware of the 14 July referendum which was held in Lithuania this year. The universal demand of the Lithuanian people was expressed at the referendum to withdraw the Russian troops this year and to compensate for the damage caused to Lithuania. This demand cannot be recalled or ignored by any Lithuanian government. Therefore, the results of the referendum should not be ignored by the Russian Government either. [words indistinct]

The Lithuanian Government aspires for such agreements which would allow to proceed further along the path of strengthening good-neighborly relations. Lithuania continues to expect Russia's concrete response to the timetable of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Lithuania which we had set up and proposed in June. [end quote] This was a statement by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

Dialogue's Continuation Urged

*LD0808045592 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 7 Aug 92*

[Statement by Vytautas Landsbergis, Supreme Council chairman, to Vilnius Radio on 7 August—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] At the moment when I am talking to you the meeting in Moscow had already been concluded. I am talking to you and at the same time I am thinking in fact of how this meeting will proceed. [sentence as heard] It is not difficult to predict...[changes thought] The Russian Government—which has not been responding for two or three months to our rather concrete proposals and to the timetable which had been set up and confirmed on how the withdrawal of the troops should begin and how the troops should be withdrawn—and the conditions for this exist—yet there is no response to this.

To my understanding, the proposal to come may not provide us with an answer. It would be good if Russia did give an answer what it thinks about our (?relations with Russia) [passage indistinct]. Russia will present its own proposals knowing very well that these would be unacceptable to Lithuania because all the people voted for a specific date and for the compensation of the damage inflicted. However, one may wish to place us in the position of some sort of a respondent, as if the proposals are presented to us, however,

we do not want to accept the proposals. Such are the diplomatic games. They are not all that simple and not all that insignificant. They can also be rather important. We are concerned if the big states have not come to some agreement, therefore, each trip abroad gives an opportunity to try to find out, or to have a presentiment of what these big ones are talking about among themselves [words indistinct] and about the Russian troops in the Baltic states.

This issue now is on the agenda of Europe. Therefore, our duty is to see that this issue is solved, that it does not remain frozen in a deadlock, and that it is not presented as if Lithuania does not want [words indistinct] has become stubborn and will not talk. Even if these proposals are unacceptable to us, we have to continue talking, to continue the dialogue. Apart from that, we cannot fall out with Russia and we must achieve the objective which, according to us, is also desirable to Russia itself. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Comments

*LD0908035992 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 7 Aug 92*

[News conference by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas with correspondents in Vilnius; introductory remarks by unidentified news conference chairman—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Chairman] We would like to hear first hand from Algirdas Saudargas how the meeting proceeded. We know from the reports disseminated by the news agencies that more than one demand had been presented to the Baltic states by the Russian Foreign Minister; therefore, it would be interesting to know how these were received by the Lithuanian side as well as by the other Baltic states. What consideration had been given to the demands presented earlier by Lithuania?

[Saudargas] [passage omitted] You of course must know about the document which is being disseminated, the journalists must have been acquainted with this document, as far as I know it has been submitted for publication in Moscow. The essence of what is written in this document, the one which is being disseminated, had been presented at the meeting by Mr Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister, in his introductory word, or shall I call it a statement. Perhaps I should briefly comment on this document because I suppose I will be asked to give my opinion on it, although at the meeting I did not comment on the stance presented by Russia. [passage omitted] I haven't mentioned it, but perhaps we all think that the main issue there was the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic states, well, there were also other issues which had been discussed at the meeting, however, this topic, no doubt, was the main one.

Concerning the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic states, resolute actions and initiative should be taken and it was said there that it should be transferred to a political level. I do not know how this should be interpreted, perhaps, concerning the meeting of our delegations, well perhaps indeed looking from the Lithuanian side we quite often felt that the Russian side lacked plenipotentiary powers. Indeed the promise was given to transfer it to the

political level, and we can take this with pleasure, which would mean that the plenipotentiary powers of the delegations would be more clearly defined and more firm in the future. [passage omitted]

The document is not specific enough as to regard it as a proposal at a concrete negotiations on the withdrawal of troops. I would say that the document lacks practical and specific geographical location because the document speaks about proposals to all the Baltic states, which could be different for each individual state; some installations are mentioned, yet it is not specified where and what kind of installations these could be and in which one of the states. Therefore, Lithuania cannot accept it in specific terms, saying that this documents directly concerns Lithuania. We are expecting a negotiation delegation from Moscow next week. On 11 August, their meeting will take place and a regular round of negotiations should begin, at which we expect the delegations to exact and clarify, in specific terms, an appropriate Russian proposal.

Before I start talking about the content I would like say a few words about the context in terms of time when the Russian stance had been presented. [passage omitted] Therefore, the Russian statement can be regarded as a response to the agreements reached at the Helsinki summit. We also regard it as a response to the proposals made by the Lithuanian side. [passage omitted] No doubt, this is not a detailed response, because the Lithuanian side had submitted a detailed schedule. Here we do not see the analysis of our timetable and of our proposals. However, I did mention the Lithuanian proposals during the talks, and I got the impression that the they have not been rejected altogether. Therefore, I hope that differences in the positions would be discussed and clarified at the meeting of the delegations. Going over to the contents of the proposal, I would divide it into three parts. The first part is an introductory part where it speaks about the protection or the equal rights of the ethnic Russians and people of other nationalities living in the Baltic states. This thesis has been voiced many times and the Russian side has repeated it frequently, therefore it is natural that it has been lifted to the first place and well shown even before speaking about anything more specifically about the troops.

Then it speaks about the readiness of the Russian side to pull out the troops, all the states have been mentioned, and the completion of the withdrawal from the Baltic states in 1994. Because it has been stressed by Foreign Minister Kozyrev that this had been coordinated with the top leadership of Russia, it can be regarded as the Russian position presented yesterday. Again I must say that this is not expressed specifically enough, although it is said that the withdrawal would be completed by the end of 1994 and all the three Baltic states are mentioned, however, what it means with regard to Lithuania, for example, is not clear. It could be withdrawn, say, in a month from Lithuania, and from Estonia by the end of the year or vice-versa.

Then following this, some leading topics are presented. Again, these have not been specified or their specific location indicated. After the meeting at the press conference I refused to comment about some strategic installations or something

like that when it was absolutely unclear even in which state these installations could be. [passage omitted]

I would think that this document as such, judging by its form, is not a formal proposal at negotiations, because it lacks concrete expression to the problem, and therefore, we are expecting such a proposal during a concrete course of negotiations. This document has probably been mainly directed at the clarification of the Russian stance, and, I would say, it contains certain features which should make the Russian position on this important issue rather attractive to the Russian public. One can find such features in this document. Specific proposals should be presented in other documents. However, I can say once again, certain conclusions about the Russian stance can be made, because it was presented with a certain authority. [passage omitted]

This document, at least, differentiates the positions of Lithuania and Russia. Up until this time, one could not tell how much these positions differed: The Lithuanian position was known, while the Russian side had some statements which were not clear enough. Although we now know that the time frame covers less than two years, it is unclear as to whether this stance means a complete withdrawal or not. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] [Passage indistinct]

[Saudargas] If you are asking about the dates, I cannot make any prognosis at the moment, I cannot make any prognosis about the course of the negotiations. I can only tell you what the position is at present. The stance of Lithuania is known. Now the Russian position has been somewhat clarified. This alone, is already a certain progress. [passage omitted]

[LIETUVOS AIDAS correspondent] A point which is strongly stressed in the theses presented by Mr Kozyrev concerns the protection of the rights of the ethnic Russians who ignore the citizenship. This is somewhat remindful of the eve of World War II, when the rights of the ethnic Germans were defended. As I understand, Mr Kozyrev indicated that he was acting on behalf of President Yeltsin. As far as I remember this issue was not included into the January communique adopted at the meeting of Vytautas Landsbergis and Boris Yeltsin. Is it possible to maintain that President Yeltsin's stance on this has changed, and if so, what could this be attributed to?

[Saudargas] I would like to repeat once again that what you are reading in the document has not been specifically directed at Lithuania and yet you speak about the meeting of specific presidents: that of Russia and Lithuania. I only said that this topic on the protection of the ethnic Russians, even if formulated differently in different cases, is not new. [passage omitted]

Specific Proposals Wanted

OW0708142292 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1319 GMT 07 Aug 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian proposals presented Thursday [6 August] by Andrey Kozyrev at the meeting of the ministers

of foreign affairs of Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in Moscow are too general and do not clearly specify Russia's positions as regards each of the Baltic countries, said Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas at a press conference in Vilnius Friday.

The minister noted, in particular, that Russia's intentions as regards its troops withdrawal from Lithuania remain unclear since the proposals of the Russian side had to do with the Baltic countries, as a whole. Mr. Saudargas says that during his meeting with Andrey Kozyrev he reminded him of the detailed timetable of the Russian troops withdrawal from the republic by the end of 1992. Lithuania prepared this timetable on the basis of the results of the national referendum earlier this years. According to Mr Saudargas, he "understood that the timetable was not declined."

Mr. Saudargas characterized as "natural" the fact that the Russian proposals were placing a special emphasis on the national minorities issue in the Baltic countries. In the meantime, the minister said that the Russian representatives could not express any concrete claims to Lithuania regarding the situation of Russians in the republic.

In his opinion, the stance Russia has assumed in regards to Lithuania will be clarified at the next round of the Lithuanian-Russian talks which are due to begin in Vilnius next Tuesday [11 August].

The Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs also said that the procedure of appointment of the Lithuanian ambassador to Russia, and Russian ambassador to Lithuania will soon be completed.

Estonian MFA Aide: Russian Stance 'Unprecedented'

LD0708134892 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1200 GMT 7 Aug 92

[Excerpts] As you know, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and the foreign ministers of the three Baltic states met yesterday in Moscow. At this morning's news conference at the Tallinn press center, the results of that meeting were described by Foreign Minister Jaan Manitski and Juri Luik, chief of the political department of the foreign ministry. [passage omitted]

To quote Juri Luik, it is unprecedented in diplomatic practice that at bilateral talks one side should demand a change in the law, and even the fundamental law, of the other side. Of course, none of the Baltic states intends to do this.

Interest was also shown at the news conference in the possibility of a summit meeting between Russia and Estonia. Jaan Manitski said this can hardly take place before the elections to the Estonian parliament, or 20 September.

Estonian Foreign Minister: Dates Not Negotiable
OW0708181192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1740 GMT 7 Aug 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "The meeting of the Russian and Baltic ministers of foreign affairs in Moscow on August 6 has not effected any

radical changes in the sides' approach to the principle issues," said Estonian Foreign Minister Jaan Manitski at a press conference in Tallinn today, Friday, August 7.

The only positive aspect of the foreign ministers' meeting, Mr. Manitski maintains, was Russia's aspiration to display "political initiative" in its relations with the Baltic states. In the meantime, the Estonian minister believes that it would be too soon to draw any conclusions on the results of the Moscow meeting.

The Estonian minister of foreign affairs categorically denies any options for Estonia to define the legal status of the Russian troops stationed on its territory. "We can establish certain provisional rules for the troops to function, but we are not going to legalize their stationing in the republic, therefore we are not even addressing any options for agreements on leasing land to Russia's military units".

Estonia will not rescind its demand to Russia to withdraw all the attack echelon elements from its territory until the end of 1992 together with the pullout of all the Russian military units from Tallinn, while the complete withdrawal of the Russian troops should be effected by the spring of 1993.

In the words of the Estonian foreign minister, Estonia does not have resources enough to finance the construction of houses for the personnel of the military units to be withdrawn from the republic, alleging that it can only allocate some labor resources and a certain quantity of construction materials.

Juri Luik, head of the Estonian MFA's political department, who also attended the meeting with Andrey Kozyrev, said at today's press conference that Estonia will never concede to Russia's requests to introduce some changes in its legislation. "Any bilateral talks relating to the issues of our country's national legislation are ultimately out of the question. Such a demand has no precedents in diplomatic history," he contended.

Jaan Manitski expressed an opinion that the Estonian-Russian summit may only take place after September 20, following the elections to the republic's State Assembly and the election of the President of the Estonian Republic. In his words, the Russian foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, is expected in Tallinn in late August-early September to address the preparations for the Russian-Estonian summit.

Lithuanian Defense Minister Rejects Russian Statement

LD0808214192 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 8 Aug 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Today we had the first reaction from the Baltic countries to yesterday's meeting in Moscow between the foreign ministers of the Baltic states and Andrey Kozyrev. You will recall that, at the meeting, Andrey Kozyrev raised the issue of Russia's desire to maintain, in the Baltic countries, a number of strategic military installations of the Russian Federation.

[A. Butkevicius, defense minister] The statement by the Russian Federation government at the negotiations, demanding that strategic military bases should be left in the Baltic republics, is clearly, I believe, at variance with our sovereignty.

Further on Remarks

LD0908164692 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2130 GMT 7 Aug 92

[Text] Meanwhile the Lithuanian Defense Minister, Audrius Butkevicius, has described Russia's proposals as an insult to international law and globally recognized agreements. The Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltics is unconditional and Moscow cannot present any preconditions, said Audrius Butkevicius speaking on the Lithuanian TV late today night.

Mr. Butkevicius stressed that the demands of the Baltics to pull out the Army from their soil was included into the Helsinki II Act. Russia's request to leave some of its military objects behind was totally unacceptable. There should be no Russian military influence in Lithuania, noted Audrius Butkevicius, adding that this was a question of great political importance.

IZVESTIYA Report on Talks

PM1008131992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Konstantin Eggert report: "Foreign Ministers of the Baltic Countries and Russia Want Their Presidents To Reach Agreement First"]

[Text] The crisis in relations between Russia and the Baltic countries continues. That is the impression you get from the meeting of Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, and Russian foreign ministers held 6 August in Moscow.

The main thing in Moscow's proposal to the Baltic capitals is its consent to withdraw units of the former Soviet Army in 1994. Let us recall that it had been said earlier that at least five years would be needed for this process. At the same time, Russia put forward a number of conditions. These included changing the legislation that infringes the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries; making clear statements on renouncing claims to Russian border lands; preserving a number of strategic installations on the territory of the Baltic states on a temporary basis; giving up claims for damages being made against the Soviet Union for the period 1940-1991; the Balt's participation in the construction of housing, partly funded from international sources, for servicemen from the units being withdrawn; and resolving the issue of compensation for the real estate being left behind by the troops.

Russia's readiness to reduce the time necessary for the withdrawal of the army and discuss the schedule for this evoked a reaction of goodwill on the part of the Baltic ministers, but that is where the positive results of the meeting essentially end. From what Algirdas Saudargas (Lithuania), Janis Jurkans (Latvia), and Jaan Manitski (Estonia) said, it is clear that as far as they are concerned, 1994 is

still an unacceptable date for the withdrawal of the troops. Furthermore, whereas they used mild wording in the presence of their Russian colleague, J. Jurkans and J. Manitski were more frank at the evening press conference at the Estonian Embassy (A. Saudargas went home immediately).

In the Foreign Ministry building, in answer to a question from IZVESTIYA on the territorial dispute on the Pechory area, the head of the Estonian foreign policy department stated that his country would be guided by "internationally recognized treaties" here. But then at the meeting with journalists at the Estonian mission he said unequivocally: Tallinn only recognizes the Tartu Treaty of 1920 which declares part of Pskov Oblast to be Estonian territory. Without mincing his words in the least, Jaan Manitski also ruled out the possibility of discussing his country's legislative acts concerning the Russian-speaking population with Russia, describing them as a strictly internal matter.

It was noticeable that the greatest tension today is between Moscow and Tallinn, but relations with Vilnius, conversely, look the least problematic. This can easily be explained: Unlike Estonia, where "Russian-speakers" make up around 40 percent of the population, in Lithuania the number of nonindigenous inhabitants is no more than 20 percent in all, and fewer ethnic Russians. There are no territorial differences of opinion between the Russian Federation and the Lithuanian Republic either.

The conditions put forward by Russia will obviously be the subject of further talks—undoubtedly unbelievably difficult ones. For example, the chief of Latvian diplomacy made it clear that strategic installations on Baltic territory can be kept under Russian control for only a short time following the dates of the withdrawal of the main grouping of troops, which will scarcely suit Moscow. Maybe the Baltic countries will give up their claims of damages for half a century of occupation, since Russia will propose that this claim should be readdressed to all the republics of the former Union. But that, in its turn, will strengthen the resolve of Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn to pay nothing for the installations left behind by our troops.

It is also hard to imagine the Baltic countries' participation in the construction of housing for servicemen on Russian land. All three ministers repeated several times that following the decisions of the CSCE Helsinki summit, which recommended that Moscow accelerate the withdrawal of the army, only the question of "when"—and not "how"—interests them.

The participants in the Moscow talks agreed to start preparing for a series of top-level bilateral meetings between the Russian president and the heads of the Baltic states. The impression created was that the diplomats do not believe that they themselves can reach agreement on anything until the fundamental problems are resolved by the top leaders. Furthermore the fact that preference has been given to bilateral talks and not general top-level talks evidently reflects the varying level of conflict in the Russian Federation's relations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. However, the Baltic leaders will most probably elaborate a joint position on the fundamental questions in advance.

"We must counter the pressure of aggressive nationalistic forces, which exist in all four states, with a democratic, legal way of resolving problems," A. Kozyrev said, appealing to his three colleagues. It will be extremely hard to put this approach into practice.

Lithianian Charge in Moscow Comments

*OW1008184292 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1820 GMT 10 Aug 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Temporary charge d'affairs of Lithuania in Moscow Egidijus Bickauskas believes that a meeting between head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Andrey Kozyrev and foreign ministers of the Baltics last week was of propagandistic character. He said Russia wanted to create an impression as if it puts forward a new initiative following the Helsinki conference.

In an interview with the Lithuanian radio Bickauskas noted that at the same time in its proposals Russia "has made certain progress".

Latvian Committee Urges Rapid Withdrawal

*OW0808193992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1449 GMT 9 Aug 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Latvian Committee (an elected body representing Latvia's pre-1940 citizens and their direct descendants) had a meeting yesterday (Friday August 7) at which it issued a statement in connection with the August 6 meeting of the foreign ministers of the Baltic states and Russia in Moscow and the 72nd anniversary of the signing of the peace treaty between Latvia and Russia.

At the foreign ministers' meeting Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said Russia was going to finish the withdrawal of its armed forces from the Baltic countries in 1994 if these countries fulfilled a number of conditions.

The committee maintains that "it is impossible to achieve stability in the Baltic region before it is completely deoccupied and decolonized."

The committee charged Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans with championing the interests of the immigrants rather than those of native Latvians.

Estonian Attitude on Russian Forces Assailed

*PM0608103592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Aug 92 Morning Edition p 3*

[Leonid Levitskiy report: "Russian Foreign Ministry Delivers Notes, But Events in Estonia Develop Despite Them"]

[Text] Just military reports are coming in from the resort town of Pjarnu: They have attacked, captured, and expelled. The air defense regiment reports its losses. The latest report is that armed Estonians seized several vehicles and captured property from the Russian military.

"Every attack on troop subunits has brought diplomatic demarches by Russia," Oleg Popovich, the Russian Federation's plenipotentiary representative, said. "Either a note from the Foreign Ministry or a statement issued by the delegation to the talks with Estonia. The Estonians have responded to our documents in a peculiar fashion. Estonia's top leaders have voiced regret and spoken of the inadmissibility of such actions. Their Foreign Ministry protests at Russian servicemen's legitimate actions. Yet the armed attacks continue. The question is: Who is controlling the Estonian armed formations?"

Regrettably, the Russian diplomatic service's efforts are rejected by the Estonian side. Its Foreign Ministry, for instance, denies discrimination against the nonindigenous population. So, adjustment of the republic's laws in line with international legal acts should not be expected as yet. The Russian Foreign Ministry has warned of its intention to approach international organizations, including the United Nations. This is certainly a justified, albeit somewhat belated, endeavor. Estonia has been working vigorously in these organizations for about two years now formally and informally, and with the combined efforts of politicians, scientists, literati, and lawyers it has succeeded in influencing European public opinion in its favor. The Russian Foreign Ministry's activity and the Supreme Soviet's disquiet are not even bolstered by opinion in Russia. ESTONIYA published an interview with A. Mikitayev, chairman of the Russian president's Committee for Questions of Citizenship. He warned the Russians outright:

"You should not rush to have yourselves labeled as a national minority. This term is right if it is a question of 3-5 percent of the population."

The correctness of this argument is dubious. Moreover, on the eve of the Russian parliament session that adopted a document condemning discrimination against Russians in Estonia Mikitayev urged Russians to take up Estonian citizenship and not be afraid of their rights being violated.

This is not the only shortcoming in the opinions held by representatives of the supreme Russian authorities. Hence the attitude to their decisions.

The Russian Foreign Ministry is now forced to belatedly tackle problems that it seemed not to notice when recognizing Estonian independence and concluding a treaty on interstate relations with it. It is hard to immediately overcome something that did not happen consistently and gradually, even with "forthright steps." That is how observers have described Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev's new approach to Baltic problems. Observers have little faith that A. Kozyrev will succeed at the 6 August meeting in impelling his Baltic colleagues to relieve Russia of the burden of the Russian question.

Army Deployed in Germany May Not Be Disbanded

LD0708121692 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1207 GMT 7 Aug 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow August 7 TASS—The 8th Guards Army, deployed on the German territory, will probably not be disbanded after its transfer to Russia, Valeriy Shuikov, secretary of the Russian Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security, told *ITAR-TASS* today, quoting information of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

The issue is being discussed at the Defence Ministry, and the impression is that the military leaders are inclined to preserve the Army, Shuikov continued. He stressed that the parliamentary committee also insisted on it. Every nation has something that is sacred to it. The 8th Army, whose reputation for heroism was won in the Stalingrad and Berlin battles during the Second World War, is sacred for Russia, Shuikov said and added that "sacred things are never thrown away."

According to Shuikov, next Tuesday [11 August] representatives of ten territorial and regional councils of people's deputies will fly to Germany to visit the Western group of Russian troops deployed on the territory of the former GDR. He was assigned to lead the delegation.

"Together with workers of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces we shall visit a number of units in the Western group and meet their commanders. The most important thing we are going to discuss will be ways of helping servicemen settle in Russia after our troops are pulled out from Germany," Shuikov said.

He stressed that the purpose of the visit is to provide local councils with information, on the basis of which they will work out measures for the social protection of servicemen.

Estonia Rejects Any Stationing of Russian Forces

LD0808095792 *Riga Radio Riga Network*
in *Latvian* 1300 GMT 7 Aug 92

[Text] Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian parliament, announced that Estonia will not, under any circumstances, agree to the stationing of Russian defense forces on her territory. He announced this after the proposal advanced by Russia to withdraw its troops from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, if the Baltic states agreed to preserve the strategic bases which, in the opinion of Russia, are essentially necessary for international security. Ruutel said that whatever the new situation in Europe, the preservation of the bases of the Russian troops is not justifiable even during a transitional period.

Troop Withdrawal From Poland, FRG Viewed

PM1008110992 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in *Russian* 7 Aug 92 p1

[Colonel Anatoliy Belousov "Military Observer's Notes": "Troop Withdrawal: Compromise Is Necessary, but Own Interests Must Not Be Forgotten"]

[Text] The systematic withdrawal of our troops from East European countries began two and a half years ago. It began accompanied by the ceremonial roll of the kettledrums. It was especially stressed at the time that the Soviet Union embarked on implementing the commitments it had

accepted as soon as the intergovernmental talks were over, taking account, on the one hand, of the wishes of broad sections of the public in the countries in question, and on the other hand, consistently steering a course toward lowering military confrontation in Europe.

We have to give Soviet diplomacy its due: Both these objectives have been achieved in full. As long ago as July of last year our troops departed from Hungary and Czechoslovakia; in approximately three months there will be no Russian combat units left in Poland and soon there will be none in Germany either, so that the level of confrontation in Europe has been lowered and the local public ought to be satisfied.

But what about our own interests? Who has been looking after them, and how has this been done, if accounts for property about to be left behind (or already left behind) in the countries in question are not being settled, while families returning (or having already returned) from the groups of forces frequently have no housing and are accommodated in wooden huts or barracks?

There is a great temptation now to blame everything on the politicians and diplomats of the former Union who did not foresee all the burdensome consequences of a hasty troop withdrawal. If only matters were that simple!

Let us take a look at how events developed and to what extent they could have been influenced.

So in March 1990 our first military trains began to move out of Czechoslovakia: 64 military garrisons had to be vacated, 73,000 men, 1,220 tanks, 1,218 artillery systems, 77 frontal aviation aircraft, and 146 helicopters had to be moved out—and all that in less than 18 months! A huge amount of work fell to the Central Group of Forces command. There was a shortage of rolling stock and containers for the transportation of household effects, and difficulties arose with train tickets. Nonetheless, the fixed schedule for the troop withdrawal, broken down into phases, was implemented without a single disruption. This was also the case in Hungary from where the Southern Group of Forces began to pull out at that time.

The time has come to address practical questions pertaining to the sale of the facilities which we are leaving behind. Our military property in Czechoslovakia was valued at 1.5 billion korunas, and in Hungary at 2.5 billion rubles. With this money it was planned to build apartments back home for the families of servicemen, tens of thousands of whom did not have any housing. However, it emerged that neither the Czechoslovak nor the Hungarian side were in any hurry to pay up. First this happened under the pretext that a uniform methodology for the valuation of the facilities in question was lacking. Then demands for compensation for ecological damage caused by our troops were brought to the fore. The so-called zero option soon began to clearly emerge in the stances of the Czechoslovak and the Hungarian leadership. It claimed that after the withdrawal of our troops from their countries, no one had any right to any compensation whatsoever; that is, we were to pull out and leave everything—well-built military garrisons, first-class airfields, depots, scrap metal, etc.—free of charge. It was then that we became

aware of the flaws in the intergovernmental agreements which had been signed. These were due to the fact that obligations pertaining to the sale of the property of the Southern and Central Groups of Forces were not clearly defined in them.

One of the solutions which suggested itself was this: Suspend troop withdrawal until the problems which had arisen are resolved. This proposal was put forward by Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander of the Southern Group of Forces and authorized agent of the government, in June 1990 when members of the Committee for Defense and State Security arrived in Hungary. The commander's statement caused an uproar in the Hungarian mass media, talks were held at the level of ministers for foreign economic relations, and even a joint protocol was published, but there the matter ended. Our special trains kept moving East right on schedule, and just as before, no money was forthcoming for the vacated garrisons and servicemen's families arriving back home had to make do with what they could find.

Unexpectedly, another problem was added to these troubles. It came from Poland. Until fall 1990 the Polish leadership had never raised the question of the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces. What is more, the Poles needed this group very much since it reliably guaranteed the security of their Western borders, but then Germany united and gave assurances that it would not demand a revision of the borders with Poland and the latter immediately demanded that the Northern Group of Forces be withdrawn. What is more, they demanded that this be done within an unrealistically short period—by the end of 1991. Entering into talks, our side declared that it would not withdraw the Northern Group of Forces until troops had left Germany because otherwise their transit through Poland could not be ensured. A complex diplomatic battle ensued which again did not end to our advantage.

In order to bring pressure to bear on our representatives at the talks, Poland refused outright to let our troops departing from Germany cross the country so they had to travel virtually around the world to get home, first by land to the Baltic, and then by ship from Rostock, or ferry from Mukran to Klaipeda, and then again by land to their new stations. Germany, with whom there are in general fewer problems concerning the troop withdrawal, gave us a billion marks for transportation expenses. However, given this sort of itinerary of the units and subunits of the Western Group of Forces and the numerous loading and unloading operations, this billion was quickly "swallowed up." It was necessary to compromise, and in the spring of 1991 the Northern Group of Forces also got moving.

The following arrangement was reached: All combat units will leave Poland by 15 November 1992, while 6,000 servicemen from the Northern Group of Forces will remain to safeguard the transit of the Western Group of Forces until the end of 1993. However, the financial and property issue once again became acute. True, there is plenty to argue about: The real estate which we are leaving behind in Poland is estimated at \$400 million. Talks are under way, but so far they have produced no results.

There has been a slight change in the situation recently, since the groups of forces switched to Russia's jurisdiction. Finally, a protocol on settling property and financial issues has been signed, but by this time the Polish side had already managed to secure the advantageous "zero" option. Now it has decided to go even further.

Our permanent correspondent with the Northern Group of Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Bugay, is constantly filing alarming reports to the editorial office: We are sustaining enormous losses as a result of local inhabitants pilfering the garrisons... An all-out diplomatic war has broken out about the airfield in Legnica; our aircraft are not allowed to take off...

It is perfectly obvious that all these attempts to bring pressure to bear are undertaken with a single aim: to avoid paying anything for the property which we are leaving behind, and if possible to grab something more, for example for guarding the facilities or for ecological damage which will allegedly be inflicted after the agreement on the withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces has been signed.

Thus we can hardly hope to sell our property either in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Poland advantageously. It is possible to invent as many artificial obstacles in this respect as you like, and the purpose of this procrastination is easy to guess: Everything left behind in these countries will stay there and in time will become their property. Ultimately, our homeless servicemen are pinning most hope on Germany. First, the German side has allocated 7.8 billion marks for housing construction, and second, our real estate in Germany, estimated at 10.5 billion marks, will clearly be sold at a smaller loss. I would not entertain any great illusions here either. While there is confusion in CIS countries because Ukraine and Byelarus are trying to get a share of the allocated money, Bonn will try to gain something for itself too.

Generally speaking, we are paying dearly now for the lack of a precise concept on the withdrawal of our troops from East European countries.

Is something similar in store for the Russian troops deployed in the Baltic republics and other regions of the former Union? The pullout of the North-Western Group of Forces which has begun shows that equally difficult problems are emerging. For the time being no interstate agreements or treaties have been signed. Only working meetings are being held. It is only to be hoped that our representatives will excel in concluding compromises which will protect the interests of Russia and its servicemen in a worthy fashion.

Elimination of Armored Vehicles Begins in FRG

At Base at Wuensdorf

LD0808184592 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1540 GMT 8 Aug 92

[Report by *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Konstantin Savvin]

[Text] Berlin, 8 Aug—The elimination of armored fighting vehicles started today in the Western Group of Forces [WGF], an integral part of the Russian Army. This measure

is being carried out in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, concluded in 1990 by 22 NATO and the former Warsaw Pact states.

The ceremony of destroying the first armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles took place in Wuensdorf at a base dealing with the elimination of armored equipment. Sections of APCs [armored personnel carrier] and IFVs [infantry fighting vehicle] were cut out by an autogenous welder, and their weapons were destroyed by cutting them up. Military experts from Great Britain, Italy, Canada, France, the United States, and the Bundeswehr representatives witnessed the procedure.

Sergey Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, and Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, who had arrived in Germany, attended the ceremony. Those present also included Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, WGF commander in chief, and Ambassador Valentin Kopteltsev, the head of the Berlin department of the Russian Federation's embassy in the FRG. The ceremony was opened by Aleksey Mityukhin, first deputy commander in chief of the WGF.

A total of 100 APCs and IFVs are to be destroyed during the first stage of the elimination of armored fighting vehicles, which will last until 6 September. By the end of 1994, a total of 2,319 armored vehicles are to be destroyed in Wuensdorf.

Shaposhnikov, Filatov Attend

PM1108134792 Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 11 Aug 92 First Edition p 1

[Anatoliy Maksimchuk report under the "Official Visit" rubric: "Precision—Politeness of the Air Force"]

[Text] Sergey Filatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, have visited the Western Group of Forces [WGF] stationed on German territory.

Together with Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, they participated in the opening of a base for the destruction of armored vehicle armaments and hardware on the territory of the Wuensdorf Garrison. A total of 27 infantry combat vehicles and 73 armored personnel carriers are to be destroyed here by 6 September under the supervision of a group of foreign inspectors. In all, it is planned to destroy 2,319 units of combat armored hardware at the base by the end of 1994. This has been stipulated by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] dated 19 November 1990 and signed by 22 states belonging to NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. The treaty came into force 17 July following ratification by the Russian parliament.

On the same day, Sergey Filatov and Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov were the guests of the personnel of the Red Banner 16th Aviation Army.

Having been stationed in Germany for almost half a century, the 16th Army—one of the most powerful aviation groupings

in Europe—is today involved in an operation unprecedented in peacetime: redeployment to Russia. The command is adhering precisely to the schedule for the withdrawal.

In a ceremonial festival atmosphere, having expressed his conviction that the aviation regiments, which have a wealth of frontline traditions, would reliably reinforce the Russian Air Force, Sergey Filatov, first deputy speaker of the Russian Parliament, handed a Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium Testimonial to Lieutenant General of Aviation Anatoliy Tarasenko, commander of the Western Group of Forces Air Force.

Further on Russian-Lithuanian Troop Withdrawal Talks

Russia Accused of Delay

*LD1008052992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2053 GMT 9 Aug 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius August 10 TASS—Lithuanian deputy parliamentary speaker Cheslovas Stankevicius has accused Russia of delaying the development of agreements on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states.

In an interview with Lithuanian television on Sunday [9 August], Stankevicius said that the talks have been in progress for six months but no schedule of withdrawal has not been worked out yet.

Stankevicius, who is heading the Lithuanian delegations to the talks with Russia on troop withdrawal, confirmed that the delegations of the two states will meet in Vilnius on August 11.

New Round of Russian Talks Opens in Vilnius

*OW1108133792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1224 GMT 11 Aug 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A new round of talks between the Russian and Lithuanian government delegations opened in Vilnius this Tuesday [11 August] morning. The countries' delegations at the talks are headed, respectively, by Viktor Isakov, the Russian MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] special ambassador, and Ceslovas Stankevicius, first deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

It is expected that the closed-doors talks in Vilnius will focus primarily on the issue of the Russian troops pullout from the territory of the republic. Knowledgeably, in early June, the Lithuanian side passed over to the Russian side its proposals regarding a four-month timetable for the Russian troops withdrawal.

At the conference of the Russian and Baltic ministers of foreign affairs in Moscow on August 6, the Russian side proposed to complete its troops withdrawal from the territories of Estonian, Latvia and Lithuania in 1994. In the

meantime, it has come up with a number of concomitant preconditions which the Baltic government turned down as unacceptable.

Troop Withdrawal Discussed

*LD1108195192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1935 GMT 11 Aug 92*

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Kazis Ustila]

[Text] Vilnius August 11 TASS—The new round of talks between the Lithuanian Republic and the Russian Federation opened in Vilnius today.

The two-day talks are held behind closed doors. It will be possible to report about their results only tomorrow. However, the sides' positions and the evaluation by the delegation heads of the talks begun were clarified from their statements to journalists.

In the run-up to talks, the Lithuanian side stated about its intention to press for the draft timetable for the withdrawal of the army of the former Soviet Union, which is now under Russia's jurisdiction, from Lithuania to become the dominant theme.

However, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Viktor Isakov, who heads the Russian state delegation, said "the whole range of issues of bilateral inter-state relations" is being discussed, adding that the talk concentrates on "thirty to forty" economic and humanitarian-legal issues, the state border, customs, problems of the Kaliningrad region and others.

According to Isakov, he presented at the talks today the Russian side's proposal for withdrawing the army in 1994. In addition, the Russian side proposes initialling the already agreed-upon Lithuanian-Russian consular convention and the draft agreement on Lithuanian-Russian cooperation in fishing.

"I think we will be able to find the common language," Isakov said.

Lithuanian Parliament Deputy Chief Ceslovas Stankjavicus, who heads the Lithuanian delegation, reproached the Russian side of not being specific enough. As regards the key theme on which the Lithuanian side puts emphasis, namely the pull-out of the army, he emphasised that Lithuania's position remains unchanged: the army should be moved out in 1992.

According to Stankjavicus, the Russian delegation does not regard the draft timetable for the army withdrawal within four months of the current year, which was proposed by Lithuania, as "unreal or unjustified". However, it declares it as "unacceptable".

He expressed hope that the Russian side "will be mindful of the results of the referendum on moving the army out this year". In addition, Stankjavicus said the Lithuanian side cannot accept Russia's proposal that it drop the demands for repairing the damage caused by the army's stay on Lithuania's territory.

The results of this round of talks are planned to be reported in a communique and at a press conference.

Delegation Heads Comment

*LD1108191292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 11 Aug 92*

[Interviews with Viktor Federovich Isakov and Ceslovas Stankevicius, respectively heads of the Russian and Lithuanian delegations to routine round of Lithuanian-Russian negotiations in Vilnius which opened on 11 August; interviews are conducted by station reporter during the first interval in the talks—recorded]

[Text] [Isakov] These are not negotiations about troop withdrawal. This is a meeting of the state delegations on all issues of bilateral relations between Lithuania and Russia, on the economy, on humanitarian and legal issues, on borders, on Kaliningrad, customs and other problems. The military issue is just one of the issues under discussion. Therefore the delegations are examining not only this issue but also the whole range of Russian-Lithuanian relations.

[Reporter] What specific proposals are being submitted by the Russian delegation?

[Isakov] In all of the four issues I have mentioned, we are coming forth with concrete proposals. Today we officially proposed that the agreed text of the consular convention be initialled. We proposed that an agreement between Lithuania and Russia on cooperation in fishing be initialled, if the Lithuanian side is ready to do this. Today we handed over to the Lithuanian side several draft agreements on military transit, on the border, on the continental shelf, on the economic zone etc. The negotiations are very specific.

[Reporter] How do you assess—how do you succeed in reaching an agreement with the Lithuanian side, that is, is the dialogue proceeding in a constructive way?

[Isakov] So far I am satisfied with the beginning, moreover, as you mentioned military issues [as heard], you know that on 6 August there was a meeting of the Lithuanian foreign minister and the Russian minister, of the ministers of Estonia and Latvia, where the Russian side submitted a package proposal on the regulation of our relations, because we are not indifferent to how relations with Lithuania are developing. We wish them to be normal, good, good neighbourly relations. We are concerned about this and we made new proposals about the withdrawal of troops by 1994.

[Reporter] Nevertheless, Viktor Fedorovich, yesterday Lithuania's residents saw the Ostankino television broadcast and heard [announcer] Irina Mishina state on television that the negotiations between Lithuania and Russia on the withdrawal of troops have reached deadlock. This was made before the beginning of this meeting. How could you comment on this?

[Isakov] I would comment that, really, our stands differed. You mentioned 1992 and we, following the official example of Estonia and Latvia, spoke of 1997 and 1999, and we could not agree. At present Russia has submitted a new schedule, a new timetable. Today I informed the Lithuanian delegation

about this. Therefore I think that we will be able to find a common language. The Lithuanian side will submit its views, we stated our stand, the schedule of the withdrawal with concrete figures [words indistinct]

[Reporter] Thus this situation cannot be called a deadlock.

[Isakov] This is a process, arguments and counter-arguments. Old stands are being defended, new stands emerging. The deadlock is, in a sense, that we did not agree up to now. Experts have been meeting since last February, but have so far failed to work out texts of agreements with the exception of one. This has been hampered by issues of schedule, timetables. Now, I hope, we will agree. The delegations have no right to sign agreements. The governments will appoint persons for this purpose. We only initial, officially confirm the readiness of some document to be presented for the government's approval.

[Reporter] Will such readiness be reached during the present meeting, and on which issues?

[Isakov] We are examining scores of issues. It is most important to untie those knots which emerge and encourage the work of the groups of experts to speed up the preparation of the texts of agreements. I hope we will be successful in this.

[Reporter] Yet another question. When we receive information from various sources in Russia, on the whole, speaking of the status of citizenship, no difference is being made between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Nevertheless, it is known that, in contrast to Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania has passed a law on citizenship which has been highly assessed even by Western experts. Self-determination is the basis of its principle. Is the work of the propaganda machine directed at something, or can you explain this in a different way?

[Isakov] I will not dwell on the merits of the Lithuanian legislation, which is more familiar to lawyers, I will only say that there are no such problems between Russia and Lithuania which exist between Russia and Latvia and Estonia. Of course, we are not only for defending the rights of ethnic Russians on the basis of Lithuanian laws, but also on the basis of international agreements. As a mother country of these ethnic Russians, be they Lithuanian Russian citizens, or Russian citizens, Russia will have contacts with them.

So far the Lithuanian side has not expressed a wish to conclude such an agreement, although, as I understand it, such an agreement has been concluded regarding the Polish minority. Moreover, if the Lithuanian legislation is good, there will be no problems for the Lithuanian side in concluding an international agreement. We are waiting. Thank you.

[Reporter] Thank you.

The Lithuanian delegation for negotiations with Russia is led by Ceslovas Stankevicius. Tell us, how is the routine round of talks proceeding?

[Stankevicius] It is proceeding in a normal way. Whereas the stand of the Republic of Lithuania is presented in a specific manner, with documents, there is no such specific manner on the Russian side. Although today the traits of such a specific manner are emerging in the words uttered by the

head of the Russian delegation, there is still a lack of clarity and definition. It is possible that we will clarify more things during the negotiations. This is my first impression.

[Reporter] Lithuania's stand on the main issues?

[Stankevicius] Lithuania's stand has been known for a long time. Troops must be withdrawn in 1992. This stand has been taken into consideration at the Helsinki meeting and there has been no specific criticism that this schedule would be unrealistic, and we have not heard such criticism today, either. We are simply told that this is unacceptable, but it is not said that this timetable is unrealistic or not well-founded. This schedule has been taken into consideration by all states which signed the general political declaration in Helsinki. It has been officially distributed to all delegations. The 15th article of the Helsinki document can be interpreted taking into account the referendum and the timetable which has been prepared.

We hope that Russia will consider the requirements of the referendum and realize that the stated timetable may be regarded as an intention to continue the presence of its army in Lithuania without the approval, more precisely, with the obvious disapproval of the Lithuanian people. We hope that Russia will change its reply stated in advance to the [word indistinct] which may be the beginning of [word indistinct] gradual withdrawal, an agreement has been reached about this between our leaders, and complete this withdrawal as soon as possible.

[Reporter] The head of the Lithuanian delegation for the negotiations with Russia also stated that the Lithuanian side cannot accept Russia's proposal to give up the demand on compensation for damage inflicted by the presence of the former USSR army on the territory of Lithuania. [passage indistinct] We hope that such discussion will take place, said Stankevicius.

Tomorrow is the last day of the meeting. A press conference will be held on its results.

Satisfaction Noted

OW1108194892 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1834 GMT 11 Aug 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Leader of the Russian delegation Victor Isakov has expressed satisfaction over the progress of negotiations between Russia and Lithuania in Vilnius, pointing out their positive character. He stressed the fact that Russia had made sound proposals in all four main areas of negotiation: the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces, economy, humanitarian and legal issues, and border policy. Victor Isakov said that the Russian delegation had officially proposed initiating the Consular Convention and the agreement on cooperation in fishery, and had presented a number of draft agreements including those on military transit, borders, the continental shelf and other matters. Commenting on new deadlines for the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from Lithuania, Isakov said that Russia had submitted another schedule for the withdrawal with exact figures at today's meeting.

The leader of Lithuania's delegation, Ceslovas Stankevicius, remarked that the meeting of the two delegations had begun quite normally. He believes that Lithuania's position is very stable, in stark contrast to that of Russia.

Ceslovas Stankevicius stressed the fact that Russia had described the schedule proposed by Lithuania for withdrawing the Russian Armed forces before the end of this year as unacceptable. He also said that Lithuania could not accept Russia's proposal to overlook reparations for losses caused by the former Soviet armed forces in the republic. "Russia's position is legally groundless, and we hope to discuss this issue", said Ceslovas Stankevicius.

The negotiations in Vilnius will end on Wednesday [12 August], and a press conference on their results will be held afterwards.

NUCLEAR TESTING

'Secret' Nuclear Test in Donbass Mine Revealed

LD0608165492 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in English 0000 GMT 5 Aug 92

[Text] The Chernobyl accident was presumably not the first nuclear disaster in Ukraine. Some facts discovered in Donbass, the eastern area of Ukraine, testify to that. Here is Marina Voyna with details.

[Voyna] Over six years passed after the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl, we know almost everything about it—because it's impossible to be aware of everything—but we couldn't imagine that nuclear accident in Chernobyl wasn't the first one in Ukraine. Only recently, people in Ukraine happened to know about the accident which took place many years ago and was kept in secret. Here is how it happened.

In the early seventies there was an earthquake in Sakhalin Island, far east of the USSR. The scientists from Moscow Mining Institute, who studied the coal mines on the island, found out that after the earthquake mine methane suddenly disappeared from the mine. Everybody knows how dangerous it is for the miners. Only in June of this year, there was a catastrophe in Donbass, caused by this eternal enemy of the miners. But let us return to Sakhalin Island and those scientists who decided to make an experiment. They proposed to get rid of the mine methane with the help of artificial explosion, a nuclear one, and they had chosen a mine in Ukraine for this experiment. This mine was situated in (?Novokommunarsk) town in the Donbass region. It goes without saying that nobody from Moscow ministry or the Academy of Sciences asked for permission in Ukraine for their nuclear test. Among those who took interest in this work were not only mining engineers and scientists but nuclear arms manufacturers.

In August 1999 [as heard], a nuclear device was delivered from Arzamas 16 to (?Novokommunarsk). It was lowered 826 meters deep into the specially prepared camera [as heard], behind the concrete wall. Nobody knew the truth about the experimental work. The citizens were evacuated under the pretext that some civil defense training would be held in their city. So on Sunday 16 September 1999 [as heard], 8,000 dwellers left their homes.

The nuclear device was exploded at 12 am by radio signal sent from Moscow. It was an artificial earthquake but without great damage to the houses. Radiation level also appeared to be normal after soil, air and water atmosphere in coal mines were tested. Next day, the miners returned to work. It is true that mine methane disappeared from mine. Gas meters proved that. Scientists were happy, as well as military men, because they held a real nuclear test in Europe with a 383 tonne TNT [trinitrotoluene] power capacity. They got very important information for their research work. As far as mine methane is concerned, it came back to the mines very soon after the blast.

People in (?Novokommunarsk) remained unaware for a long time. Only some rumors appeared about the underground nuclear test but the public kept silent. It was only after the Chernobyl accident and miners' strikes in Donbass that people demanded the whole truth about nuclear experiments in their city. It appears that (?Novokommunarsk) was a sole radioactive spot, with radiation level several times higher above the natural one. One could say that the reason of this radiation lies not only in that old experiment, eventually there was Chernobyl in 1986. Probably there were some other reasons and only experts' opinions will help to find the answer to this question. A group of experts was organized to examine the situation. They have got the necessary modern equipment, which is sophisticated enough to tell the old radiation from the new one. As soon as we know the results of their work, we will inform you about them in our program.

Claims of Kemerovo Nuclear Tests Aired

LD0608170992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1241 GMT 5 Aug 92

[By SIA-correspondent—TASS]

[Text] Kemerovo—Aman Tuleyev, chairman of the Kemerovo Regional Council, has addressed identical telegrams to the Russian president, to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, to the acting chairman of the Russian Government, and to the "Chernobyl of Russia" State Committee, saying that he had data proving that an atomic explosion was set off in the northern part of Kemerovo region in September 1984, and that the southern part of the Kuznetsk coal basin had suffered for the same reason in 1953—radioactive fall-out in the area was caused by a nuclear blast on the Semipalatinsk testing ground. This is confirmed by data received from local public health bodies.

Tuleyev asks the country's leadership either to refute this information or to instruct an authoritative commission to look into the matter. He suggests that money should be allocated from the Russian budget to treat the afflicted if harmful radioactivity is confirmed in the region.

Reaction to U.S. Senate Vote for Moratorium

LD0708181892 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1710 GMT 6 Aug 92

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] There has been unwelcome reaction in the Pentagon to the U.S. Senate's decision to impose a nine-month

moratorium on nuclear testing and its total termination in 1996. Vladislav Kozyakov writes the following in comment:

What is particularly striking is that stalemates by Pentagon officials are categorical. Army Colonel David Burpee has announced that the Pentagon will recommend a presidential veto on the nuclear testing termination bill if it is approved by Congress. Another Pentagon spokesman, Pete Williams, has declared that the Defense Department is against both the moratorium and the full termination of tests. Such a position is rather one-sided.

It clearly underestimates the new realities in the world and in the United States itself. What should be done now is to take yet another logical step towards ridding the world of a nuclear menace. Such a step would be the proper follow up to the Russian-American understandings to drastically cut their nuclear arsenals. As Senator Mark Radfield has remarked, a stage by stage nuclear test ban tallies with the agreement between Moscow and Washington and meets common sense.

The situation is now quite conducive to settle yet another problem left over from the cold war period because nuclear test sites have been unoperational in Russia and France, too. These two countries have declared a moratorium on testing to last until the end of this year. If the U.S. Congress approves the bill the moratorium will affect three nuclear powers already and will most likely be in effect at least until the second half of next year. This time could be used for talks on signing a permanent test ban treaty.

When the Pentagon describes the position on testing other than its own irresponsible, this looks strange. In the Senate, the moratorium was favored by 68 senators. In the House of Representatives, 237 voted for the bill. Opinion polls invariably show that most Americans stand for the termination of testing. The Democratic nominee to the presidency, Bill Clinton, has spoken out in favor of sharply reducing underground nuclear testing in two stages and subsequently stopping nuclear tests in full. Are all these voices not enough for America to give the problem a new fresh look?

Of course each nuclear power has advocated total nuclear test ban and critics of such an approach, and Russia is no exception. [sentence as heard] But critics differ. Some military representatives and senior Atomic Energy Ministry officials in Moscow argue that tests need to be resumed in 1993, but only if the United States refuses to follow suit and put a moratorium on explosions in Nevada. There is a unique chance in our nuclear age to prolong the moratorium and to hold talks on ending nuclear weapons tests once and for all. Much depends on the American position. The ball is now in Washington's court.

Reporters Visit Secret Nuclear Test Hospital

AU1208101992

[Editorial Report] Mainz ZDF Television Network in German at 2010 GMT on 11 August carries a 46-minute report entitled "Radioactivity—The Fateful Silence; Kazakhstan's Secret Hospital Opens Its Archives" by Minette von Krosigk and Joerg Apfelbach.

The German television team visited Hospital No. 4 in Semipalatinsk, which was established by the military in 1961 and where doctors secretly examined thousands of people to see the effects of nuclear tests on people's health. The reporter says that over the past 40 years "almost 500 nuclear tests" took place in the area and that "more than 100 bombs were detonated above ground, before the eyes of the defenseless population." About 1 million people reportedly live in the area surrounding the nuclear test site.

In 1990 the hospital officially ceased its examinations. The German reporters were the "very first" outsiders permitted to visit the hospital. Now it is called "Kazakh Institute for Radiology and Ecology," but the director remained the same, Dr. Boris Ivanovich Gusev. The reporter notes that more than 30,000 reports on patients and about 40,000 samples are stored in the hospital archives, and that annual research reports, which are still top secret, are kept in safes.

Director Gusev is shown presenting to the journalists a map of radioactive contamination and noting that it is the "very first time" that this map has been shown to journalists. Illustrating his explanations with the map, Gusev says: "This map was drawn up as early as 1963, but it has never been accessible to the general public, neither the public abroad nor the mass media nor the doctors in our country. As I have told you, this map shows the nine most important and strongest explosions, which took place between 1949 and 1963. The 1949 explosion was the first. It took place on 29 August. The bomb that was exploded on the test site had a capacity of 18 to 20 kilotons. The wind blew northeast. As a result of immense low clouds, enormously large territories were contaminated by radioactive fallout. These included the territory of the Altai district, the area of Semipalatinsk, and eastern Kazakhstan. The levels were so high that they were comparable to the actual conditions of a nuclear war, a real nuclear war. According to our calculations, the explosion of 1949 alone contaminated at least 100,000 people."

The reporter goes on to describe how the patients were examined: Diagnoses were told neither to the patient nor to his doctor, but "served exclusively military and scientific interests. Even when the disastrous effects of the nuclear tests on the population became obvious, the reports remained secret, and the hospital kept collecting data as usual."

Gusev is shown pointing out files of patients who live very close to the site of the tests, and describing their illnesses. The reporter notes that there are "still no exact statistics" of deaths among these people.

The television team then visits various highly contaminated villages to talk to eyewitnesses of the explosion. The most affected places are Kuchatov, which is "practically inaccessible," Moystik, Dolon, Chereomushkiy, Sarshall, and Kainar.

The journalists, accompanied by Gusev, visit Moystik, Chereomushkiy, Sarshall, and Kainar, where they are shown severely handicapped children, whose handicaps are reportedly due to radioactive contamination of their parents. During the first visit, to Moystik, Gusev stresses that the severely mentally and physically handicapped boy they see

there is "certainly not an isolated case." The reporter notes that "according to the hospital's statistical research, hereditary diseases due to radiation damage to the chromosomes are about 3.5 times as frequent in the contaminated areas as among the normal population far from the test site." The reporter says that Dr. Gusev's statistics, which have so far not been permitted to be published, also prove severe damage to the health of adults: The life span among the contaminated people is clearly shorter; in the contaminated areas twice as many people suffer from high blood pressure and heart attacks than those far from the test site; the immune system is considerably weaker; infectious diseases are increasing, the incidence of tuberculosis is rising; over the past 20 years there have been more cases of cancer, and benign tumors are also found quite often.

In Kainar the journalists visit the district hospital, where, it is said, there is a lack of personnel, equipment, and pharmaceuticals, and as a result, medical treatment is reportedly deficient. The hospital is responsible for the medical treatment of 10,000 people, even though it is designed only to deal with a catchment area of 3,000 people. The reporter notes that "according to the unanimous statements of the doctors, the general state of health of the people is deteriorating." It is noted that fatalities among babies and children are increasing; soil samples of the area reportedly show 2,000 times higher radioactivity than normal.

The journalists then talk to a former radio operator at the nuclear test sites, who now works as a shepherd because he has been sick since 1956. The man says that the doctors have always played down his sickness, he does not receive treatment or financial support, and his family is also sick.

They follow various eyewitness reports of nuclear tests with interspersed film clips of such tests.

The report continues with shots taken again at Hospital No. 4, where Gusev shows a radiometer that indicates radioactivity in the air. He describes the procedures in case of alarm, but points out that the equipment did not yet exist when nuclear tests were made above ground, because the building was not yet there. Gusev shows samples that were tested for radioactivity. The reporter notes that all kinds of substances were tested and can still be found on the shelves; Gusev explains how these tests were carried out by showing the various pieces of equipment used. The data was top secret and only available to the Army and to the government in Moscow, it is pointed out.

Then Gusev opens a safe to show medical reports, which, according to him, have never been shown to anyone other than those who ordered them. He shows several of these reports and explains their purpose. The author of the first major report in 1958, Dr. Saym Balmukhanov, confirms the authenticity of his report, which he now sees for the first time since he wrote it, and describes his work at that time. Subsequently, Gusev describes Balmukhanov's report, noting that the report went to Moscow and the government decided that Balmukhanov was wrong, because the result was so negative. Another expedition was sent, and the Moscow report of 1960 contradicted Balmukhanov's report.

The journalists then visit the collection of the medical museum in Semipalatinsk, where deformed fetuses with, for example, two heads or only one eye are conserved. The director of the children's hospital in Semipalatinsk is interviewed and says that such deformities should be diagnosed before birth and that the institute should concentrate on examining the groups most at risk.

Children with severe sicknesses are shown in the hospital. The director notes that the state of health of children in this district is deteriorating. A chronic weakening of the immune system, the so-called "nuclear AIDS," is becoming increasingly common.

The cemetery in Semipalatinsk is then shown, where many graves of young children and relatively young adults can be seen.

The report concludes with scenes of a wedding, of babies in the Semipalatinsk hospital, and of an old man, who describes how much of Kazakhstan has been destroyed.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Official 'Satisfied' With PRC Troop Talks

OW0708022092 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin
0900 GMT 6 Aug 92

[From the "Current Event and Commentary" program]

[Text] Representatives from four CIS countries and China have concluded the seventh round of talks in Moscow on mutual troop reduction and military confidence building along border areas. Our reporter Solovyev interviewed (Beleyev), an official of the Russian Foreign Ministry and participant in the talks, on the results of the talks.

(Beleyev) said: I would like to point out that this is the first time Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are joining in the talks as a joint delegation of four sovereign states. This is important because they could have held talks individually to solve the problem of reducing border troops, but it is more efficient to work together, and the results of the seventh round of talks have proven it. We did not encounter any problem while discussing the joint position of the four states in the talks, and this had an impact on the outcome of the talks. Moreover, the Chinese side has also assumed an attitude of mutual understanding.

(Beleyev) continued: In the seventh round of talks, we have greatly promoted the work of drawing up the draft agreement on reducing border troops and building confidence—the basics of this document have been agreed upon. It is a complicated job and requires much time to achieve. For

example, troops and kinds of weapons to be reduced, localities involved, supervision over the troop reduction, and other issues were all discussed in the talks. I would like to say that we are very satisfied with the results of the talks. It is predictable that we will complete our common work in the near future. Whether the issues already agreed upon are to be included in the CIS-Chinese agreement remains unsolved, but this is not the main problem. What is essential is that we have taken a step forward toward the ultimate aim—completely eliminating the border confrontations of the past. This is a very important step toward the road of friendship with our Chinese neighbor.

Commentary on PRC Armed Forces, Technology

LD1008132392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 10 Aug 92

[Commentary by A. Ilyichev; from the "Novosti" news-cast]

[Text] It seems that the PRC is preparing to fill the vacuum in Southeast Asia following the reduction in the U.S. and Russian military presence there. It is actively organizing its armed forces. Having decided to reduce its army manpower by 500,000, the PRC is moving to upgrade its technology. Arms purchases from the ex-USSR, primarily from Russia, are playing an important role. The Japanese press reports that the PRC has already taken delivery of a first group of SU-27 fighters this year, and another two squadrons of them are on order from Russia. A contract has also been signed for delivery of two squadrons of SU-31 interceptors and a large number of tanks. On top of that, the purchase of the aircraft carrier Varyag, under construction in Nikolayev, will be officially announced any day now. These events are being watched with a degree of alarm in Asia.

Tension along the Sino-Russian border has decreased, but the PRC still has plenty of claims against its southern neighbors: A border problem with India has yet to be resolved; Beijing and Taipei are theoretically at war; and the dispute over territorial rights to the Spratly Islands has flared again—Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, as well as the PRC, have claimed them. Nobody is rejoicing at the prospect of a militarily stronger PRC. Japan has already let it be known that continued military deliveries to the PRC could affect Western aid to Russia. Other countries, unable to exert pressure in this way, seem to be adopting the Chinese option. India, a traditional purchaser of Soviet arms, is modernizing its fleet. Malaysia and Indonesia, to the PRC's pique, intend to buy fighter aircraft from the ex-USSR. Of course, weapons are a lucrative business and bring in high dividends today. However, will they be comparable to the strategic repercussions tomorrow of such sales?

FRANCE

New Zealand Reassured About Nuclear Testing

LD0508083492 Melbourne Radio Australia
in English 0700 GMT 5 Aug 92

[Text] France has repeated its assurance that it will not conduct any nuclear tests in the Pacific before April of next year. France announced last April a one-year suspension of its nuclear testing program, saying the suspension could become permanent if other countries followed suit. The NEW ZEALAND PRESS ASSOCIATION quotes the French ambassador to Wellington, Gabriel de Bellecize, as saying that France had no intention of testing before April 1993. De Bellecize received a submission from the nongovernment group, Lawyers Against Torture/Oppression Anywhere, LATOA, threatening legal action if French tests resumed.

LATOA spokesman Colin Avery said the group was pleased with the assurance. It gave members time to prepare for legal action, which could be necessary next April if France resumed testing.

A borehole is reported to have been made in Mururoa lagoon in preparation for the next nuclear tests. France has undertaken more than 130 underground nuclear tests in the South Pacific since 1975.

Former Premier Rejects New Zealand Comment on Nuclear Tests

BK0608110892 Hong Kong AFP in English
0936 GMT 6 Aug 92

[Text] Noumea, New Caledonia, Aug 6 (AFP)—New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger should have remained silent on the possible resumption of French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, former French premier Michel Rocard said Thursday [6 August].

"Nuclear tests are a worldwide problem that cannot be treated unilaterally, I hope that France is not the only country to give an example and I don't think this effort is destined for failure," said Rocard, adding that Bolger had "lost a good opportunity to keep his mouth shut."

France announced in April the suspension of its nuclear testing program in the Pacific for the rest of 1992, and has been waiting for reaction from other nuclear powers to reconsider its 1993 program.

Bolger had remarked Monday that a resumption of French nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll "would raise the anger of countries in the South Pacific region," who would perceive such testing as "an expression of the arrogance of a faraway power."

But Rocard was careful to explain his country's position on the subject.

"It is clear that France hopes to get rid of nuclear tests," he said, speaking to the press during a three-day private visit to the French South Pacific territory of New Caledonia.

"If it is seen that there is unilateral pressure against the French state that she alone should interrupt her

testing and quit the nuclear club, while others remain in it, I will voluntarily speak of an arrogance, not of New Zealand ... but maybe of Mr. Bolger," Rocard said.

"Today, the principal problem is from Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, who are the principal countries with nuclear arms," he said. "But France also has the right to wait for its example to be followed by the United States, China, and Britain."

Rocard repeated that improvements in France's relations with South Pacific nations were continuing, but that no state could ask France "to be the only one to renounce its nuclear (program)."

He also praised the U.S. Senate which announced, with a large majority, a nine-month moratorium on nuclear testing followed by three years of limited tests.

The former French premier is on a tour of the Pacific which will take him to China, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Australia. He left Noumea on Thursday for French Polynesia where part of his family lives.

GERMANY

Destruction of Former GDR Weaponry Under CFE Begins

Foreign Minister Comments

LD0308092292 Hamburg DPA in German 0843 GMT
3 Aug 92

[Text] Muehlhausen (DPA)—The dismantling of conventional weapons in Germany agreed upon by treaty began today in Rockensussra, Thuringia, with the destruction of weapons from the former GDR National People's Army. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel described the day as "a symbol of the victory of reason and morality over confrontation and the arms race." In total, 40,000 combat tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery pieces, and combat aircraft are to be destroyed in Europe by 1995 under the terms of the CFE treaty on conventional disarmament in Europe.

Kinkel said that the greatest number of systems, namely 11,000, are being destroyed in Germany. Russia will follow suit in a few days, he said. The foreign minister announced that limiting the personnel strength of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 is also to be initiated very soon.

Defense Minister Praises Action

LD0308103792 Hamburg DPA in German 1000 GMT
3 Aug 92

[Excerpts] Muehlhausen (DPA)—Germany began the destruction of armored personnel carriers from the stocks of the former GDR People's Army today. [passage omitted]

Defense Minister Volker Ruehe said that the destruction of the weapons is a success for years of German security policy. "In a Europe of democratic states and pluralist societies, there is no longer room for overarmament and arsenals bristling with weapons such as in times of the cold war," the minister said.

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